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WHO'S LIABLE FOR CYBERWRONGS?
Assaf Hamdanit

The Internet has provided new opportunitiesfor wrongdoers and novel
challengesfor law enforcement. Frustratedby the relative anonymity of users,
plaintiffs and law enforcers have increasinglysought to hold Internet Service
Providers (ISPs)liablefor their users' misconduct. Yet, legal analysis of ISP
liability is balkanized, confining itself to particulardoctrinalcontexts, thus
obscuringcommon issues underlying all instances of ISP liability. This Article rectifies this shortcoming by developing a new framework for evaluating
ISP liability: the incentive-divergence thesis. Because the incentives of ISPs
diverge from those of their users, subjectingISPs to full liability would produce excessive censorship of Internet communication. Legal responses to this
risk of excessive censorship should therefore be tailored to the market's ability
to align ISPs' incentives with those of their users. The Article proposes three
distinct strategiesfor imposing ISP liability: combining strict ISP liability
with scaled-down penalties, regulatingthe ISP-subscriberinterface, and imposing negligence-based liability. The Article also illuminates several existing legal puzzles: the peculiardoctrine of vicarious infringement and its
application in the Napster case, the regulation of ISP liability under the
new Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the optimal liability regime for
illegal sales on auction sites.
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INTRODUCTION

Like the new frontier of the Wild West in the nineteenth century,
the booms and busts of the Internet have been accompanied by new
opportunities for criminals and new challenges for law enforcement.
The global reach of the Internet, its inexpensive transmission of information, and the relative anonymity of its users all contribute to the
treacherous environment for law enforcement.1 However, unlike the
Wild West, most people's access to the Internet comes through a select group of gatekeepers known as Internet Service Providers, or
ISPs.2
1

See, e.g.,

PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCr ON THE INTERNET,

U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET (2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
unlawful.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
2 ISPs provide users With various Internet-related services. Common examples of

ISPs include: Internet access providers (companies that enable their subscribers to access
the Internet), web-hosting service providers (companies that host their subscribers' web
pages on their servers and enable third parties to access these pages), and online service
providers (companies that operate a website and enable third parties to post materials on
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Unlike their users, ISP gatekeepers are readily identifiable and
susceptible to sanction. These dual characteristics have led to a consensus that, under appropriate circumstances, ISPs should be held legally liable for their users' wrongdoing.3 ISP liability, however,
presents lawmakers, courts, and academics with a host of new dilemmas, including the following: (1) To what extent should an ISP be
liable when it enables its customers to swap unauthorized digital copies of copyrighted music?; (2) Should an ISP be liable for hate material offered for sale through its auction site?; and (3) Under what
conditions should a website offering its users the ability to upload
materials to its "forums" sections be responsible when its users post
defamatory statements?
Oddly, the literature so far has addressed each issue separately,
confining itself to the particular doctrinal question at stake. 4 Commentators have debated, for example, whether ISPs should face direct, vicarious, or contributory liability for copyright infringement by
users, 5 and whether ISPs should be deemed publishers, distributors,
or common carriers in determining their liability for online defamation. 6 Unfortunately, this fragmented approach obscures the common fundamental features that underlie all instances of ISP liability.
All cases of ISP liability require courts and legislators to delineate the
appropriate scope of the liability imposed on a third party-the ISPfor the misconduct of its users. In all cases, the ISP has exclusive technical control over user misconduct, and is thus positioned to prevent
misconduct-by blocking user access to the Internet, for examplewithout the cooperation of the user. Relatedly, the key issue in all
their site). Unless stated othenvise, I will use the term ISP to denote all three. For an

example of a statutory definition of ISP, see infra note 166.
3 To be sure, and as will be demonstrated throughout the Article, much controversy
exists over the desirable scope of ISP liability. Nonetheless, the basic principle that ISPs
might, under appropriate circumstances, face liability for their subscribers' misconduct is
undisputed. See generally TIMOTHY D. CAsEY, ISP LLABI=Tr SURVIvAL GUIDE (2000) (providing guidance to ISPs on avoiding liability for subscriber misconduct).
4 One notable exception is Professor Katyal's recent article on law enforcement in
cyberspace. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003
(2001) (developing strategies for dealing with a wide range of cybercrimes). While his
article explores various strategies of law enforcement in some depth, it provides a relatively
brief analysis of the important topic underlying this Article-designing optimal liability
standards for ISPs. See id. at 1095-1101.
5 For a discussion of the controversy over the liability of ISPs for subscriber infringement, see infra Part IV.A.
6 See generallyJonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for
Online Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Ac4 52 FED. COMM. LJ.
647, 664-65 (2000) (arguing against the imposition of distributor liability on service providers); David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications
Decenty Act upon LiabilityforDefamationon the Internet 61 ALB. L. Rxv. 147, 179 (1997) (arguing that service providers should face "distributor liability" for defamation); Developments in
the Law-The Law of Cyberspace 112 HARV. L. REv. 1574, 1612-22 (1999) (describing the
debate over the proper classification of ISPs).
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these cases is not the technical ability to prevent misconduct, but the
extent to which ISPs can distinguish legitimate and illegitimate user
activities. Transcending doctrinal boundaries, these common yet unnoticed features call for the development of a general framework for
analyzing and designing ISP liability.
7
This Article adds four key insights to the analysis of ISP liability.

First, the Article identifies ISP liability as a coherent analytical category of liability, and locates it within the larger framework of thirdparty liability.8 Second, the Article explains why strict liability-the
traditional prescription of economic analysts for the liability of primary wrongdoers-will produce overdeterrence when applied to liable third parties such as ISPs. Third, the Article shows that no single
rule should cover all cases of third-party liability-an observation that
I label the "incentive-divergence thesis." Thus, the Article provides a
novel framework capable of tailoring legal regimes to different types
of Internet services. Specifically, I offer three distinct strategies for
implementing the incentive-divergence thesis in setting ISP liability:
strict ISP liability with scaled-down penalties, regulation of the ISPsubscriber interface, and negligence-based liability. Fourth, and finally, the Article demonstrates the illuminating power of the incentive-divergence thesis by using it to explain otherwise mysterious
aspects of the recent Napsterdecision 9 and Tide II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.10

The implications of my analysis can be seen in contrast to the
standard law-and-economics position calling for strict liability. The
standard of strict liability is generally preferred, because it not only
provides defendants with optimal incentives to prevent misconduct,
but also ensures that defendants will adopt an optimal level of activity. 11 Under this conventional position, ISPs would face strict liability
for user misconduct. Consider the liability of an Internet access provider, such as Yale University, for copyright infringement by students
7 This Article does not consider the fundamental question whether the Internet
could be governed by traditional legal regimes. For representative examples of this debate,
see David R.Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,48 STAN.
L. REv. 1367, 1400-02 (1996) (expressing skepticism over the feasibility of traditional legal
regulation in cyberspace); and Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Ca. L. REv.
1199, 1199-1201 (1998) (criticizing the position adopted byJohnson and Post).
8 For a review of the existing scholarship on third-party liability, see infra Part IA.
The term "third party" is often used to distinguish third parties from primary wrongdoers
and victims (second parties). See also Katyal, supra note 4, at 1007-08 (referring to ISPs as
"third parties" and victims as "second parties").
9 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), afflg in part and
rev'g in part 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
10
17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. V 1999).
11
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcruRE OF
TORT LAW 66-71 (1987); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
2-3 (1980).
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who use Napster while using private computers connected to the Yale
network. 12 If Yale were to face strict liability, the argument goes, it
would exercise the socially desirable level of effort to prevent copyright infringement by its users, and price its Internet services
appropriately.
Notably, strict liability appeals not only to economic theorists; beginning with the endorsement of strict liability by President Clinton's
Information Infrastructure Task Force on the Protection of Intellectual Property over the Internet, 13 a substantial number of courts, including the Northern District of California in the Napster case, 14 and
academics have urged applying strict liability to ISPs. 15
This Article shows otherwise. I argue that holding ISPs strictly
liable for the full social harm produced by user misconduct would
induce them to adopt excessive levels of monitoring and employ
overly zealous censorship policies. This is because one of the key assumptions of the economic literature, namely, that actors capture the
full value of their conduct, does not necessarily apply to ISPs, or, indeed, to any third parties. While Yale might be technically positioned
to control the transmission of information through its networks-by
blocking access to Napster, for example-Yale does not capture the
12 This example is not imaginary. Indeed, in April 2000, the rock group Metallica
sued Yale University as the provider of Internet access to its students using Napster's services. See John Borland, Yale Drops Napster After Legal Pressure, CNEr NEWS.COM, Apr. 19,
2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1719530.html. Immediately aftenvards,
Yale decided to block its students' access to Napster. Id.
13 See RONALD H. BROWN & BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLEcrUAL PROPERLY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE

114-24 (1995)

(describing the development of the need for strict liability to ISPs for subscriber copyright
infringement), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
14 See Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913-22, 927 (granting preliminary injunction
against Napster after finding it strictly liable for all copyrighted files downloaded through
its server); Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding
the operator of a bulletin board service that allowed users to upload illegal copies of Playboy photographs liable for copyright infringement, regardless of prior awareness), superseded by statute as stated in ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir.
2001); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4-*5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995) (finding that Prodigy, an ISP, is a "publisher" for defamation purposes
and thus should be held strictly liable for defamatory statements posted on its bulletin
boards), superseded by statute as stated in Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331
(4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that 47 U.S.C. § 230 "forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions"); see
also Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service ProviderLiabilityfor Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendmen4 88 GEo. LJ. 1833, 1852, 1856 (2000) (emphasizing
that the risk of courts' holding ISPs strictly liable is real).
15 SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "InformationSuperhighway". Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace,95 COLUM. L. REv. 1466, 1493-94 (1995) (describing policy
considerations behind imposing vicarious liability for copyright infringement on commercial ISPs); I. Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 993,
1044 (1994) (arguing that imposing strict liability on ISPs will make them internalize the
social costs of wrongdoing and adjust the scope of their activity accordingly).
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full value of such information. Rather, student users of Napster are
the primary beneficiaries of information transmitted through Yale's
network. Stated differently, Yale does not bear the full cost of its policing effort; the cost is, at least in part, borne by Napster users attending Yale. Hence, under a regime of strict liability for user misconduct,
Yale would assign disproportionate weight to the risk of legal liability
and disregard the loss caused to students as a result of the newly
blocked or removed user information. This divergence of incentives
would lead Yale to monitor user information excessively, and remove
materials suspected of being unlawful, even when social interest dictates otherwise.
Having identified the potential for overdeterrence, I proceed to
develop the incentive-divergence thesis by crafting a framework for
optimizing liability standards for ISPs. My analysis proceeds in three
stages.
First, I identify two existing approaches concerning the appropriate response to overdeterrence produced by the divergence of user
and ISP incentives. These two analyses may be labeled the "restrictive"
and "market" approaches. Noting the divergence of incentives between primary wrongdoers and ISPs, the restrictive approach calls for
placing categorical limitations on third-party liability.1 6 By contrast,
the market approach dismisses the risk of ISP overdeterrence on the
grounds that competition among ISPs would eliminate the divergence
17
of incentives between users and service providers.
In the second stage, I demonstrate the shortcomings of both existing approaches and offer a new alternative: the incentive-divergence thesis. My analysis focuses on contractual failures that produce
divergent incentives, on the one hand, and market forces that alleviate the effects of such divergent incentives, on the other. I argue that
the severity of overdeterrence varies across markets and contractual
relationships, and that the law should take these differences into consideration. In an ideal world, the market approach would be correct,
and ISPs and subscribers would contract to avoid excessive monitoring
by ISPs. In the real world, however, transaction costs preclude such
16
Most calls for placing categorical limitations on third-party liability have arisen in
the analogous context of employer vicarious liability for hostile environment based on coworker harassing speech, an area where the imposition of liability has sparked much de-

bate. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47

RUTGERS L. REV. 579, 582-85 (1995) (positing that the vicarious liability of employers induces them to over-censor employee speech); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile
Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 647-48 (1997) (arguing that
cautious employers would excessively restrict employee speech). But see Suzanne Sangree,
Title VII ProhibitionsAgainst HostileEnvironment Sexual Harassmentand the FirstAmendment: No
Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 461, 479 (1995) (suggesting that "employee morale"

would prevent overregulation of speech by employers).
17
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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an ideal solution, and ISPs and subscribers thus maintain divergent
incentives. Moreover, the magnitude of this divergence of incentives
depends on factors such as the degree of competition in the relevant
market, the existence of profit-sharing agreements between the parties, and the cost of ex post negotiation. For example, auction sites,
whose fees increase in proportion to the sale price of items sold
through their site, have monitoring incentives closely aligned to those
of their subscribers. By contrast, universities, which provide free Internet access to their students, are subject to very different incentives
than their users.
Thus, in the third stage, I use the incentive-divergence thesis to
tailor three specific strategies for optimizing deterrence notwithstanding divergent incentives. The first legal strategy, which I call scaleddown strict liability, would impose strict liability on ISPs while reducing the magnitude of penalties. This simple strategy, although intuitively appealing to the economic mind, would result in optimal
deterrence only in a very limited set of cases. Specifically, scaling
down penalties under a strict liability regime would achieve optimal
deterrence only for ISPs that, at the margin, suffer an actual loss for
each item screened off their system. ISPs will suffer such a loss for
each item removed from their systems only if their contract with their
subscribers provides for a profit-sharing agreement, as in the case of
auction sites.18
The second strategy, which I label interface regulation, seeks to
regulate the ISP-subscriber interface. Under this strategy, lawmakers
will seek to regulate the relationship between ISPs and their subscribers with the aim of assisting the parties to overcome their divergence
of incentives through private contracting.
The third strategy aims to render the divergence of incentives irrelevant by making the state, rather than ISPs, set the desirable level
of monitoring. This goal can be achieved through either a monitoring-regulation regime or a negligence-based regime. A monitoringregulation regime assigns lawmakers the task of specifying the extent
to which ISPs should inspect the information disseminated through
their networks. Monitoring regulation differs from interface regulation in that it does not touch most of the contractual arrangements
between ISP and subscriber, focusing instead on the narrow question
of monitoring. Like monitoring regulation, properly designed negligence standards might also achieve the right level of monitoring by
ISPs. The key difference between the negligence-based regime and
the monitoring-regulation regime lies in the identity of the institution
18 But see Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(holding that an auction site is not liable for infringing items posted for sale on its site).
For a detailed analysis of the optimal legal regime for auction sites, see infra Part IV.G.
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setting the optimal level of monitoring. Under negligence, courts will
set the optimal level of monitoring that ISPs must adopt. In contrast,
under a monitoring-regulation regime, a regulator will set the desirable level of monitoring. As I will explain below, 19 these mechanisms
thus differ with respect to their suitability to the rapid technological
changes characterizing cyberspace.
I illustrate the insights produced by the incentive-divergence thesis by exploring three aspects of ISP liability. First, I analyze the puzzling doctrine of vicarious liability for copyright infringement, most
recently applied in the Napster cases. 20 The incentive-divergence thesis, I argue, supplies a novel understanding of the economic function
of vicarious liability, and sheds a new light on the Napster decision.
Second, I evaluate the regulatory framework adopted by Congress in
Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.21 This Act
mildly alleviates the divergence of incentives between subscribers and
ISPs. I argue, however, that these measures are insufficient, and fail to
assign the proper weight to the different incentives of providers of
hosting services and the providers of Internet access. Finally, I devise
a regime to govern the liability of auction sites, such as eBay, for unlawful items offered for sale through their system.
The implications of the incentive-divergence thesis go beyond
cyberspace. Legal systems increasingly rely on complex regimes of
third-party liability. Prominent examples include accomplice liability
in criminal law; lender liability for cleanup costs; and underwriter,
lawyer, and accountant liability for securities fraud. 22 But while the
practical role of third-party liability is gaining in importance, the optimal structure of third-party liability has received scant attention by the
academic literature. 23 This Article advances the understanding of
19 See infra Part III.C.3.
20 A& M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), af'gin part and
rev'g in part 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
21
17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. V 1999).
22 See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323 (1985) (analyzing accomplice liability in criminal law);
Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants Under Rule

lOb-5, 53 Bus. LAw. 1157 (1998) (reviewing recent development in secondary liability for
securities fraud); Michael I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw, Note, To Lend or Not to LendThat Should Not Be the Question: The Uncertainties of Lender Liability Under CE-RCLA, 41 Duia

L.J. 1211 (1992) (reviewing lender liability under U.S. environmental law). See also David
B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: RegulatingLawers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1145, 1160-1215 (1993) (discussing attorney liability in the aftermath of the savings and
loan crisis).
23 In his authoritative book providing a comprehensive analysis of the economic theory of liability, Professor Steven Shavell only tangentially addresses the theory of third-party
liability by discussing the related topic of vicarious liability. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 170-75 (1987); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
The Economic Theory ofPublic Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000) (offering
a review of the economic theory of public enforcement, but providing no discussion of
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third-party liability by systematically analyzing one subset of third-party
liability cases-those in which the third party has full technical control
over the primary wrongdoer's conduct. Instances of this type of thirdparty liability include employer liability for employee communications
under sexual harassment law,24 liability of distributors of obscene
films, 25 and liability of third parties for defaming statements. 26 In all

these cases, the divergence of incentives between the third party and
the primary wrongdoer might lead the third party to be too cautious.
Accordingly, the incentive-divergence thesis, and the legal strategies I
develop under that thesis, could be useful in eliminating overdeterrence in these cases as well.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I lays the groundwork for
analyzing ISP liability by outlining existing economic theories of primary and third-party liability. This Part highlights the prominent role
of strict liability within the economic literature, reviews the existing
economic understanding of third-party liability, and introduces the
overdeterrence phenomenon associated with ISP liability. Part II outlines the incentive-divergence thesis, and compares it to the market
approach and the restrictive approach. This Part identifies the transaction costs that produce overdeterrence and explores the role of
market forces in limiting the severity of the problem. Part III introduces three strategies for implementing the incentive-divergence
thesis. These strategies include scaled-down strict liability, interface
regulation, and negligence-based liability. Part IV illustrates the wider
implications of the incentive-divergence thesis by analyzing ISP vicarious liability for copyright infringement, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the liability of auction sites for illegal items posted for
sale on their system.
I
ISP LABnLI

AND OVERDETERRENCE

This Article contends that strict liability, although correctly embraced by the economic literature as the optimal standard of liability
third-party liability). By contrast, the economic literature studying the liability of lenders
for cleanup costs has extensively examined third-party liability. See, e.g., Marcel Boyer &
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Environmental Risks and Bank Liability, 41 EUR. ECON. REv. 1427
(1997); Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case ofJudgment-ProofFirmsand
Environmental Risk, 85 Ama. ECON. REV. 1171 (1995); Kathleen Segerson, Liability Transfers:
An Economic Assessment of Buyer and Lender Liability, 25J. ENvTL. ECON. MGMT. S-46 (1993).
24 See supra note 16.
25 See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 67-78 (1994) (interpreting the relevant statute to require knowledge of minority status by child pornography
distributor in order to avoid constitutional challenges).
26
On the three-tiered regime of liability for defamation, see Barry J. Waldman, A
Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: Defamation on the Internet, A Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 9,
33 (Fall 1999), at http://wrv.richmond.edu/JOLT/v6i2/notel.html.
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for primary wrongdoers, should not govern ISP liability for subscriber
misconduct. As necessary background for the Article's thesis, this Part
first outlines the current economic theory of third-party liability.
Then, after discussing the prominent role of strict liability in the economic literature, I show that, given the different incentive structure
facing primary wrongdoers and third parties, imposing strict liability
on ISPs would result in overdeterrence-excessive monitoring and
overzealous censorship by ISPs.
A.

The (Missing) Theory of Third-Party Liability

Relying on the general framework developed by Reinier Kraakman, 27 this subpart outlines the basic theory of third-party liability and
its implications for ISP liability. I focus on three aspects of the theory:
why third parties are held liable, why ISPs are targeted, and the nature
of the distinction between primary and third-party liability.
1.

Why ISP Liability?

Deterrence theory seeks to impose on wrongdoers the social cost
of their wrongdoing. 28 In our context, this would mean making subscribers-such as Yale students who use Napster-liable for the full
cost of their misconduct. The conditions of the Internet environment, however, might make this goal unattainable. Consider the challenge of imposing sanctions on subscribers who use the Internet to
violate copyright laws. The relative anonymity of Internet users makes
detection of those who violate copyright laws very costly; absent Yale's
cooperation, record companies will not easily be able to identify student users of Napster. 29 Even when the identity of infringers is uncovered, they often turn out to be judgment-proof teenagers or college
27 See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986). Several writers have analyzed a related topic: the allocation
of liability between corporations and their employees. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Vicarious
Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits ofEmployee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1705
(1996) (arguing that corporate, rather than personal, liability best promotes reasonable
decisionmaking); Harry A. Newman & David W. Wright, Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent
Model, 10 Ir'L REv. L. & ECON. 219, 220 (1990) (finding that "strict liability induces the
owner to offer employment contracts that motivate the agent to take a socially optimal
level of care"); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984)
(using economic analysis to evaluate the efficiencies of vicarious liability).
28 See infra Part I.B.
29 See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Wat the PublisherCan Teach the Patient: IntellectualProperty
and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication,52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1206-08 (2000) (describing the cost of detecting, prosecuting, and punishing infringers). Of course, the cost of
detecting Internet users is determined by the relevant legal regime and the architecture of
the Internet, which in turn is also affected by regulation. See generally LA-,VRENCE LESSIG,
CODE AND
OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE (1999)
(analyzing the interaction of these
elements).

2002]

WHO'S L[ABLE FOR CYBERWRONGS?

students, who lack the means to pay damages. 30 Thus, in many cases it
would be impossible to impose upon copyright-infringing Internet
users the full optimal penalties dictated by deterrence considerations.
Expanding liability to third parties is thus required to cope with the
1
underdeterrence of Internet subscribers.3
In the case of cyber-misconduct, potential candidates for thirdparty liability include, among others, makers of personal computers,
developers of Internet browsers, and makers of modems. 3 2 Liability
should be expanded, however, only to those parties positioned to prevent misconduct at a reasonably low cost.33 Following doctrine and

academic literature, this Article takes ISP liability as a given, and assumes that ISP liability is justified due to the ability of Internet service
providers to prevent subscriber misconduct cheaply.
Granted the expansion of liability to ISPs, the Article will focus on
the nature of the liability standards that should govern ISP liability.
The literature dealing with third-party liability has struggled mostly
34
with the basic need for third-party liability in particular contexts.
But the challenge posed by enlisting ISPs to prevent user misconduct
is clearly different. The failure of subscriber-only liability to prevent
cyber-misconduct is virtually undisputable, and there is a general consensus that ISPs should be harnessed to the preventive effort. At the
same time, however, there is a controversy over identifying the standard that should govern ISP liability for user misconduct. This aspect
of third-party liability, which has remained curiously unexplored by
the economic literature, is the focus of this Article.

30 See, e.g., Ian C. Ballon, Pinningthe Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for
Imposing Vicarious Cop)right, Trademark and Tort Liabilityfor Conduct Occurringover the Internet,
18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 729, 734-35 (1996) (pointing out that many of the most
notorious Internet criminal prosecutions brought by the government have targeted college
students); Michael B. Rutner, Note, The ASCAP Licensing Model and the Internet: A Potential
Solution to High-Tech Copyright Infringemen 39 B.C. L. REv. 1061, 1070 (noting that most
cyber-infringers are individuals who "do not have enough assets to make legal action
worthwhile").
31
See Reinier H. Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategiesand the Costs of Legal Controls,93
YALE L.J. 857, 888-96 (1984) (explaining that third-party liability is required to address
"enforcement failures" leading to underdeterrence).
32
SeeYen, supra note 14, at 1864 (noting that, in theory, all providers of information
technology could be held liable).
33 See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lauyers to Improve the
Regulation ofFinancialInstitutions,66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1040-41 (1993); Kraakman, supra
note 31, at 61.
34
See generally Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916
(1998) (providing a thorough analysis of the justification for imposing liability on financial
intermediaries); Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary , 17J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988) (arguing that accountant liability for negligently prepared audits is unjustified).
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Third-Party vs. Primary Liability

Focusing on primary wrongdoing, the economic literature assumes that liability should make users internalize the social cost of
their wrongdoing. This assumption implies that defendants should
ultimately bear the losses produced by their conduct even when they
are unable to prevent these losses, because internalizing these costs

35
will induce defendants to adopt an optimal scale of activity.

Third-party liability, however, is different. It is commonly accepted that the scale of third parties' activity should not be adjusted to
the social cost of wrongdoing. 36 Applied to ISPs, this assumption implies that the goal of ISP liability is not to make ISPs scale down the
amount of services they offer to subscribers. Rather, the goal of expanding liability to ISPs is to prevent user misconduct. Thus, in the
remainder of this Article, I assume that ISPs should not internalize the
social loss produced by subscriber conduct that they are unable to prevent. As my analysis of the Napsterdecisions will show, this assumption
is critical for reconciling the conflicting approaches over the scope of
37
vicarious copyright infringement.
One final clarification should be made before turning to the ISP
overdeterrence phenomenon. In this Article, I assume that the distinction between primary wrongdoers and third parties is clear. Internet users are assumed to be primary wrongdoers while the
providers of Internet services are assumed to be third parties exposed
to liability due to the failure of primary liability to prevent user misconduct.3 8 In reality, however, demarcating the boundary between
primary and secondary liability might prove to be a daunting analytical task.3 9 I will thus return to the distinction between primary and
40
secondary liability in Part IV.

35 See discussion infra Part I.B.
36 See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1988)
(developing the notion of enterprise causation to distinguish primary and secondary
wrongdoing).
37 See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
38 See Yen, supra note 14, at 1856-65 (arguing that ISPs should be treated as third
parties and thus should not internalize the cost of cyber-misconduct). But cf.Hardy, supra
note 15, at 1044 (supporting strict ISP liability under the assumption that Internet service
providers should adjust the scope of their services to the social costs associated with subscriber misconduct).
39 Cf Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct"and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REv. 691, 712-75 (1997)
(analyzing the murky distinction between primary and third-party liability for securities
fraud).
40 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2 (exploring the implications of this problematic distinction for delineating the scope of vicarious liability for copyright infringement).
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Strict Liability and ISPs: A Primer

What is the position of economic theory regarding the optimal
standard of ISP liability? The starting point of the economic theory of
deterrence is that wrongdoers have no incentive to forgo misconduct
because they do not internalize the social harm produced by their
behavior. Accordingly, the legal system should aspire to make wrongdoers pay for the harm that they cause, and thereby induce them to
prevent the harmful consequences of their undesirable conduct. To
achieve optimaldeterrence, the legal system should make the expected
penalty, or the amount of damages, equal to the social harm.41 The
intuition underlying this conclusion is straightforward: as the penalties make wrongdoers internalize the full social harm associated with
their conduct, they will be induced to take the socially desirable steps
to prevent that harm. 42 A wrongdoer would have no incentive to exercise too much care because the marginal increase in the cost of care
would exceed the marginal saving in liability cost. Likewise, a wrongdoer would have no incentive to exercise too little care because the
marginal increase in liability cost would exceed the marginal saving
on care.
Conventional economic wisdom also prefers strict liability to negligence. Both strict liability and negligence induce wrongdoers to exercise an optimal level of care, but only strict liability would induce
defendants to adjust the scope of their activity to the optimal level. 43
41
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARv. L. REv. 869, 873-75 (1998) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, PunitiveDamages]
(using this insight tojustify punitive damages in limited contexts). When the probability of

detection is lower than one, the optimal penalty should be such that the expected penalty
remains equal to social harm. That is, the sanction should equal social harm multiplied by
the inverse of the probability of detection. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (making this argument in the
context of public enforcement). Another justification for making penalties differ from
social harm is risk aversion. When defendants are risk averse, the optimal penalty might
turn out to be smaller than social harm. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 880, 880,
885 (1979) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoft]. This Article proceeds
under the assumption that ISP defendants are risk neutral. This assumption is justified for
two reasons. First, to the extent that ISPs face civil liability, they might be able to purchase
liability insurance. Second, some ISPs, such as AOL, are public corporations, which are
assumed to be risk neutral.
42 See Polinsky & Shavell, PunitiveDamages, supra note 41, at 879 (explaining that "[i]f
damages equal harm, potential injurers will in theory have socially correct incentives to
take precautions").
43 This is because strict liability makes wrongdoers pay for the full social harm produced by their conduct regardless of their level of care. SeeJennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, ControllingCorporateMisconduct: An Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 687, 692-93 (1997) (emphasizing the goal of achieving optimal level of production in
setting optimal liability standards for corporations); Shavell, supra note 11, at 3. The endorsement of strict liability by the economic literature is manifested also in the context of
corporate criminal liability. See Daniel R Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J.
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Finally, and more important for our purposes, strict liability imposes a
relatively light informational burden on courts. Under strict liability,
courts need only inquire about the social harm. 44 Based on their expected liability, defendants then determine what level of care to
adopt. 45 Under negligence, in contrast, courts have to inquire not

only about social harm, but also about the cost of care and the actual
level of care exercised by the defendant. 46 Because wrongdoers are
generally better positioned than lawmakers or courts to determine the
47
appropriate level of care, strict liability is superior.
The implications for ISP liability are straightforward. Under this
depiction of the economic position, ISPs should face strict liability for
the full social harm associated with user misconduct. Consider the
liability of an Internet access provider, such as AOL, for copyright infringement by its users. Facing strict liability, the argument goes, AOL
would not only exercise the socially desirable amount of effort to prevent user misconduct, but also charge optimal prices for its Internet
services. Moreover, under a regime of strict liability, all that courts
have to do is verify the harm caused by user misconduct. Courts
should inquire into neither the actual policies adopted by AOL to prevent user misconduct nor the desirable policy of ISP monitoring. 48
This outcome is desirable because AOL is arguably better positioned
than courts to determine what monitoring technology would most effectively prevent user misconduct.
Invoking the prohibitive cost of monitoring user conduct over
the Internet, commentators have commonly discarded strict liability as
319, 328 (1996) (rejecting any type of "negligence-based" penalties for corporate crimes because such a regime "might allow the corporation to externalize certain social costs of doing business"); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of CorporateFault a Faulty Notion?:
The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 359 (1999) (concluding that "even
though mens rea standards for individuals may prove desirable for many reasons, corporate mens rea standards are generally undesirable").
44 Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain InformationAbout Risk, 21J. LEGAL
LEGAL STUD.

STUD.

45

259, 269 (1992).

See Shavell, supra note 11, at 8.
See id. at 8-9.
47
This is because wrongdoers possess private information about their cost of care
while courts would have to exercise costly effort to acquire this information. See Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARv.
L. REV. 713, 726-27 (1996). This insight motivates Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell to
prefer liability rules over property rules. See id. at 725-27 (emphasizing that, regardless of
how imperfect the state's information is about harm or prevention costs, a liability rule
with damages equal to average harm is superior to a property rule); see also Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 188 (1973) (under strict liability,
"[t]here is no need to ask the hard question of which branch of government is best able to
make cost-benefit determinations, because the matter is left in private hands").
48
For such straightforward application of the economic theory of deterrence to ISPs,
see Hardy, supra note 15, at 1044-46 (endorsing the imposition of strict liability on ISPs on
economic grounds). This simple application of economic analysis perhaps can account for
the lack of a body of economically oriented scholarship addressing ISP liability.
46
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unsuitable for the ISP industry. 49 The argument against strict liability
is basically the following: While some users indeed abuse their Internet access for committing misconduct, the majority of users rely on
their Internet access to engage in legitimate activities. ISPs are unable
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate user conduct without monitoring the information disseminated through their networks. 50 The voluminous amount of data transmitted through the
Internet makes such monitoring very costly.5 1 Strict liability, therefore, is undesirable because it fails to take into account the high cost
52
of monitoring.
This argument is perhaps correct in describing the high cost of
monitoring user conduct. Nonetheless, it is inconsistent with economic theory. As Steven Shavell has shown, strict liability provides uninformed defendants with optimal incentives to acquire
information. 53 Hence, the allegedly prohibitive cost of monitoring
should not, by itself, preclude the adoption of strict liability: if monitoring is indeed too costly, ISPs will prefer to pay damages rather than
bear the cost of monitoring; if monitoring is desirable, ISPs will find
54
monitoring to be cheaper than liability costs.
This Article, however, introduces a more convincing reason for
questioning the wisdom of subjecting ISPs to strict liability. The dominance of strict liability has originated within the paradigm of primary
liability. ISP liability, by contrast, is secondary in nature, because the
primary wrongdoers are users, and not the companies providing them
with Internet services. 55 In the next subpart, I shall explain why the
49
See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyfight Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyight Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 C~mwozo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 345, 399-410 (1995); Yen, supra note 14, at 1843-72.
50 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 49, at 405.
51
See Yen, supra note 14, at 1852-53; Christian C.M. Beams, Note, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service Providers: Problem Solved... for Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823,
830 (1999) (arguing that the immense size of the Web makes ISP monitoring almost impossible); R Carter Kirkwood, Comment, When Should Computer Owners Be Liable for COPyright Infringement by Users , 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 709, 711-12 (1997) (arguing that monitoring
by ISPs would be "extremely expensive").
52
See M. David Dobbins, Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for Users' InfringingActs, 94 MICH. L. REV. 217, 227 (1995) ("Although it might be possible for a bulletin board operator to prevent infringement by ... monitoring every upload and download
to the bulletin board, requiring such control would be unrealistic and burdensome.").
53
Shavell, supra note 44, at 260; see also Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed
Individuals, and Acquiring InformationAbout Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 93 (1990) (applying similar analysis to study the effort to obtain information about

law).
54
To be sure, the degree to which ISPs can successfully monitor user conduct is relevant for the decision to expand liability to ISPs. If they are unable to detect user misconduct, subjecting ISPs to liability might be unjustified. See supra text accompanying note 33.
55
For a discussion of this assumption, see supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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status of ISPs as third parties is significant in producing overdeterrence under strict liability.
C.

On Divergent Incentives and Overly Zealous ISPs

The existing economic understanding outlined in the preceding
subparts raises the first doubt over imposing strict liability on ISPs. As
ISPs are not considered to be the primary wrongdoers, they should
not internalize the social cost of user misconduct. Hence, the optimal-production objective of strict liability should not be extended to
ISP liability. 5 6 Current understanding, however, leaves intact the insight that strict liability will induce service providers to engage in the
desirable level of effort to police subscriber misconduct. This subpart
challenges this insight and argues that, given the different incentive
structure facing primary wrongdoers and third parties, imposing strict
liability on ISPs would result in overdeterrence in the form of excessive monitoring by ISPs and overzealous censorship policies. In this
subpart, I identify and analyze the third-party overdeterrence problem. In the next Part, I will review in depth the causes and the limits
of this overdeterrence phenomenon.
1.

The Divergent Incentives of Third Parties

This section argues that subjecting ISPs to strict liability induces
them to monitor excessively against subscriber misconduct and
overzealously censor materials suspected of being illegitimate. The
analysis applies to many scenarios in which: (1) from a pure technical
perspective, the third party exercises control over the conduct of the
primary wrongdoer and is thus positioned to prevent misconduct independently, without the cooperation of the primary wrongdoer; and
(2) the cost borne by the third party for preventing the conduct is
negligible. For expositional convenience, however, the remainder of
this section will analyze the liability of web-hosting service providers
for their subscribers' copyright infringement.
Maintaining a website requires website owners to store the website information on a server, which would be accessible to visitors
through the Internet. Web-hosting companies provide physical space
on their servers where users can store their website data. The subscriber designs the site, determines what materials to post and what
activities will be offered to visitors, whereas the web-hosting ISP is usually paid according to the storage space assigned to the subscriber and
56 Imposing strict liability may lead to overdeterrence to the extent that third parties
will unjustifiably scale down their level of production. See Sykes, supra note 36, at 578-79
(arguing that negligence standards should be imposed on third parties because the goal of
optimal production is inapplicable).
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the volume of traffic the site generates. 57 Assume that the subscriber
posts photographs on his website, some of which might be unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. Because it stores the website
data, the ISP is technically capable of preventing all copyright infringement by removing infringing items from its servers. Moreover,
the cost of removing a given photograph by the ISP is virtually zero.
To prevent only infringing conduct, however, the ISP must examine
the photographs posted by the user and determine which ones are
infringing and which ones are not. The thesis that I offer is that,
under strict liability for copyright infringement, the ISP will adopt an
overly aggressive monitoring policy, and remove too many legal photographs from its users' sites.
Unlike the primary wrongdoers depicted by the economic literature, ISPs do not capture the full value of the conduct they are entrusted with policing. While economic theory assumes that
wrongdoers do not internalize the losses associated with their conduct, it does assume that wrongdoers capture the benefits of their
conduct.5 8 Under this view, strict liability, which makes wrongdoers

internalize the full social cost of their conduct, aligns private incentives with social interest. Once wrongdoers internalize both full social
cost and social gain produced by their conduct, they will be induced
to take the socially optimal steps to prevent harm. However, this key
assumption does not necessarily hold with respect to third parties,
who do not always capture the full value of the conduct they are
obliged to monitor.5 9 In our example, web-hosting service providers
do not capture the full value of each photograph posted by their subscribers on their servers. Rather, the ISP is paid a fixed fee, which
depends on the space used by the subscriber. Given this "positive ex57 Earthlink, for example, charges a fixed fee that varies according to the storage
space provided and the amount of traffic allowed. For example, as ofJanuary 19, 2002, the
monthly fee for 175 megabytes of storage space and traffic limit of 10 gigabytes has been
$19.95. See Earthlink, Inc., Web Hosting Packages, at vww.earthlink.com/business/ecommerce/smartsite.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002). Some ISPs, AOL for example, provide
their users with limited free web-hosting services. AOL Time Warner Inc., AOL Home
Page, at http://www.aol.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2002). The conclusions of this Part apply, perhaps with even greater force, to these types of hosting services.
58
See generallyKeith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
977 (1996) (noting that assumption and exploring its implications). My argument differs
from Hylton's in several respects. First, Hylton limits his discussion to primary wrongdoing
and therefore attributes the lack of internalization to the existence of thin markets. This
Article, in contrast, explores the link between third-party liability and the lack of internalization of benefits. Second, Hylton advocates the adoption of negligence rules and overlooks other plausible strategies identified in this Article.
59
This Article does not address another type of cost potentially ignored by service
providers-the loss of network benefits produced by blocking access to the Internet. See
Katyal, supranote 4, at 1084-87, 1098-99 (arguing that victims and ISPs will not take into
account the network benefits associated with Internet use and, thus, might engage in
overprecaution).

918

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:901

ternalities" problem, the conventional prescription of economic analysis-set penalties to equal social harm-would result in
overdeterrence, the adoption of overly aggressive monitoring policies,
and excessive censorship practices by ISPs.
2.

In-House Hosting

To illustrate the ISP overdeterrence phenomenon, it would be
useful to contrast a scenario in which subscribers use their own computers to host their website with a scenario in which subscribers contract with ISPs for hosting services. This section shows that the
monitoring and censorship practices employed by a subscriber who
uses in-house hosting would be optimal under a regime of strict liability for copyright infringement. The next section shows that imposing
identical liability on an ISP would produce excessive censorship.
Assume that a website owner uses her own computer systems to
host her website. The owner faces strict liability for any unauthorized
photograph posted on that site, and must decide what level of monitoring to exercise to verify the legal status of such photographs. 60 As
the standard economic account shows, the website owner would adopt
the socially optimal level of monitoring. 6 1 To be sure, under conditions of costly information, the optimal level of monitoring might re62
sult in the removal of perfectly legal photographs from the server.
Yet, as long as the owner internalizes both the social value of the content that she posts on her site and the social harm associated with
copyright infringement, the amount of legal photographs removed
would be optimal.
The following example demonstrates this argument. The value
of each photograph posted on the site is 200. The penalty for posting
a copyrighted photograph without permission equals social harm,
60
1 assume that the owner would not post copyrighted photographs that she knows to
be infringing without permission because the penalty for copyright infringement exceeds
the benefits from posting such photographs. See infra text following note 111 (elaborating
on that assumption and analyzing its implications for choosing alternatives to strict
liability).
61
See Shavell, supranote 44, at 260 (asserting that strict liability induces defendants to
adopt optimal level of investment in acquiring information).
62
This will be the case when the cost of obtaining additional information exceeds the
expected value of this information. Consider the following example: Having acquired
some information about photograph A, the owner believes the likelihood this photograph
is infringing is 70%. The social harm from infringement, as well as the sanction for infringement, equals 100. The value of posting the photograph is 50. Further investigating
the legal status of the photograph would cost 150. It is therefore evident that further
inquiring is not desirable because the cost of such inquiry exceeds the value of posting the
photograph. Given the uncertainty over the infringing nature of the photograph, however, it is desirable not to post it, because the expected harm from infringement, 70, exceeds the value of posting the photograph. This would be the case even if, in hindsight, it
turned out the photograph had been perfectly legal.
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1000. The probability that any given picture is infringing is 0.1. The
owner needs to choose between two alternative monitoring technologies: 63 Technology A, which is known to detect only 50% of infringing
photographs, costs 20 per photograph examined. Technology B,
known to detect 60% of infringing photographs, also entails a cost of
20 per photograph. This technology, however, would incorrectly
identify 10% of the legal copies as illegal. Table 1 summarizes the
owner's costs and benefits from adopting the two technologies.
TABE 1: MONITORING DECISION BY A SINGLE ENTITY

Technology
None
A
B

Expected Cost
100
20+50=70
20+40=60

Expected Benefit
200
200-10=190
200-18-12=168

Net Value
100
120
110

The owner's expected value from posting a photograph on the
site equals the expected benefit of the photograph minus the expected liability for copyright infringement. Without adopting any of
the technologies, the owner's expected value of operating the site is
100 (200 - 0.1 x 1000). Adopting Technology A leaves the owner with
an expected value of 120 (200 - 20 - 0.5 x 0.1 x 200 - 0.5 x 0.1 x
1000). Adopting Technology B leaves the owner with an expected
value of 110 (200 - 20 - 0.6 x 0.1 x 200 - 0.1 x 0.9 x 200 - 0.4 x 0.1 x
1000). The owner will undoubtedly choose the first monitoring technology. As economic theory projects, Technology A is also the socially
optimal one.
3.

Outsourced Hosting

The technology adopted to identify infringement will differ if the
website owner contracts with an ISP for hosting services. 64 For simplicity, assume that the owner is judgment-proof and therefore exer63 Making the website owner choose between two monitoring technologies rather
than reach individual decisions for each picture is consistent with practice, where the
emerging trend is automating the process of monitoring and screening rather than exercising individualjudgment. The process of automated monitoring for unlawful content is
commonly known as filtering. See R Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MiNN.
L. REv. 755, 757 (1999). While this trend may not reflect the actual practices of individual
website owners, it definitely reflects the practice of ISPs, who must monitor large volumes
of information and traffic. Of course, the text's focus on monitoring technology does not
undermine the generality of the argument that incentive divergence leads to
overdeterrence.
64 The decision to contract for services rather than perform them within the boundaries of the firm has been extensively studied by the economic literature. See, e.g., OLIVER
HART, FiRis, CoN'Rrars ANDn
FiNANcIL STRucruRE 21-28 (1995) (reviewing economic approaches to the issue); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 398-405
(1937). In this Article, I take this decision to be exogenous, i.e., unaffected by considera-
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cises no effort to investigate the legal status of the materials posted on
her site, and that the ISP is paid a fixed fee according to the storage
space assigned to the user. To prevent online copyright infringement,
the legal system imposes liability on ISPs whenever the materials
stored on their servers, the photographs posted by the subscriber in
our example, are infringing. Table 2 summarizes the costs and benefits of the two technologies from the perspective of the ISP.
TABLE

Technology
None
A
B

2:

MONITORING BY AN

Monitoring Cost
0
20
20

ISP

Liability Cost
100
50
40

Total Costs
100
70
60

As the ISP is paid a fixed fee, it captures no value from allowing
an additional photograph to be stored on its servers. The ISP therefore does not take into account the cost of monitoring produced by
the removal of photographs from the website it hosts. On the other
hand, the ISP faces strict liability for the full social harm caused by
user infringement. As a result, the ISP would adopt the second, nonoptimal monitoring technology. 65

Under no monitoring, the ex-

pected cost for the ISP equals its expected liability. The value of monitoring for the ISP consists of its reduction in expected liability costs.
Thus, adopting Technology A leaves the ISP with an expected cost of
20 + 50 = 70. Adopting Technology B leaves the ISP with an expected
cost of 20 + 40 = 60. Thus, the ISP would adopt the second, overly
aggressive technology.
The choice of Technology B by the ISP is the outcome of the
different incentives faced by the subscriber, the primary wrongdoer,
and the ISP, the third party. Were it to choose a monitoring technology, the primary wrongdoer would take into account not only expected social harm and the actual cost of monitoring, but also the cost
associated with the removal of non-infringing photographs from the
website. The ISP decision, by contrast, is not affected by the value of
items removed due to the inaccuracy of the monitoring technology.
tions of expected liability. But see discussion infra text following note 91 (relaxing somewhat this assumption).
65 The overdeterrence problem caused by strict liability mirrors the alleged overdeterrence caused by subjecting corporate managers to personal liability. Cf Bruce Chapman,
Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1679, 1687-94
(1996) (arguing that because the cost of managerial care is borne by shareholders, imposing strict liability on managers will induce them into overcompliance); Jonathan R. Macey,
Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 315, 319 (1991)
(emphasizing that managerial liability could lead to overdeterrence of managers because

of managerial risk aversion).
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The overdeterrence of ISPs can take two forms. First, as illustrated in
the numerical example, the ISP would tend to apply an overly aggressive monitoring technology that would excessively remove materials
from the Internet. Second, the ISP might decide to pay an excessive
price for purchasing and implementing a monitoring technology (our
example assumed that monitoring technologies equal in their actual
costs and differ only with respect to their level of accuracy).
The key implication of the ISP overdeterrence phenomenon is
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the legal system cannot limit its
role to imposing penalties that equal social harm, yet still rely on the
information held by defendants to make them take optimal care.
Since third parties do not internalize the full social value of the underlying activities, making them pay for full social harm would result in
overcompliance. In Part III, I elaborate on the legal mechanisms that
could eliminate the risk of excessive censorship while promoting the
goal of preventing user misconduct. First, however, I shall explore in
depth the sources for the divergent incentives of ISPs and their
subscribers.
II
THE INCENTIVE-DIVERGENCE THEsis
The conclusion of the preceding Part can be stated as follows:
When the incentives of the third party diverge from those of the primary wrongdoer, imposing liability on the third party might result in
overdeterrence. This observation generates two conflicting responses.
The first approach, which I shall label the "restrictive approach," invokes the divergence of incentives to support broad restrictions on
third-party liability. Members of the restrictive camp question the
constitutionality of third-party liability and argue, for example, that
third-party liability should be imposed only where the courts have predetermined that the conduct is unlawful. 66 The second approach,
which I shall label the "market approach," argues that the risk of
overdeterrence is overstated because market forces, especially competition in the market for Internet services, would align the incentives of
primary wrongdoers and third parties. 67 The logic underlying the
66

See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers:Identifying the

"Speaker" Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 122 (1995) (arguing that third

parties should "only be responsible for distributing the speech of another if they have
,actual notice' that the speech has previously been adjudicated illegal or unprotected"); see
also supra note 16 (making similar points with respect to employer liability for sexual harassment in the workplace).
67 Though this approach has not been explicitly stated in the ISP context, it mirrors
the approach of the Chicago School to the agency problem in corporate law. Under this
approach, competition in the markets for capital, products, and managerial services will
drive the management of public corporations to take shareholder interest into account.
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market approach is simple. ISPs compete to attract subscribers. Subscribers would prefer to purchase services from ISPs that do not engage in excessive censorship. As a result, ISPs wishing to attract users
would not adopt overly zealous censorship practices. Thus, the market, and not modifying liability rules, will be most effective in eliminating overdeterrence.
I find both categorical approaches to be flawed. Both approaches
adopt a uniform view of the third-party overdeterrence phenomenon,
under which all instances of third-party liability should receive identical treatment. In contrast, this Article posits that the magnitude of
the overdeterrence problem varies across services offered by third parties. In this Part, I seek to enhance the understanding of the
overdeterrence phenomenon by developing a framework that would
enable policymakers to distinguish various types of third parties and
tailor legal solutions accordingly. First, I analyze the causes for the
divergence of incentives between third parties and primary wrongdoers, and show why a categorical market approach might be flawed.
Second, I highlight conditions that might mitigate the overdeterrence
phenomenon, and therefore suggest that the restrictive approach is
also unsatisfactory.
A.

Transaction Costs and the Market Approach

This subpart explores the causes for the divergence of incentives
between ISPs and their subscribers. As will be shown, the basic intuition underlying the market approach is correct. The mutual interest
of the parties ex ante is indeed to commit the ISP to optimal screening and censorship practices. What the market approach misses, however, is that transaction costs of different types might prevent the
parties from achieving privately this desirable outcome and eliminating the risk of overzealous censorship by ISPs. Moreover, some of
these impediments to the ability of the parties to resolve the problem
are the product of legal rules. Rather than leaving market forces to
eliminate the risk of overdeterrence, an optimal regime of ISP liability
must devise strategies to overcome these impediments.
To uncover the roots of the ISP overdeterrence phenomenon, it
might be useful to think about the relationship between users and
ISPs in terms of a principal-agent relationship. The principal, the subscriber, hires the agent, the ISP, to host its webpage for a fee. The
agent can act independently to prevent the principal's misconduct. 68
For prominent advocates of this approach, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
The CorporateContract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1447 (1989); and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theoy of the Corporation,6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289 (1977).
68 In fact, imposing liability on the ISP produces two parallel sets of principal-agent
problems. First, the subscriber might engage in illegal activity, and thereby subject the ISP

WHO'S LIABLE FOR CYBERWRONGS?

2002]

Because the agent faces liability for the actions of the principal, it
would be too cautious whenever its incentives are not aligned with
those of the principal. This subpart explores the extent to which the
interests of the parties can be aligned.
The starting point is that, like in many other principal-agent relationships, the mutual interest of the parties ex ante is to commit the
ISP to optimal monitoring policy, because such commitment would
maximize the joint surplus produced by the transaction. 69 The previous web-hosting example illustrates this mutual interest of the parties.
When the ISP adopts the optimal monitoring technology, A, the expected benefit to the subscriber is 190 (the value per photograph of
200, multiplied by the expected number of photographs, or 0.95),
while the expected cost for the ISP is 70 (monitoring cost of 20, plus
expected liability cost of 50). When the ISP adopts the suboptimal
monitoring technology, B, expected subscriber benefit is 170 (200 x
0.85), whereas the expected cost for the ISP is 60 (20 + 40). Switching
from Technology B to Technology A adds to the subscriber an expected benefit of 20 (190 - 170), while increasing the expected liability of the ISP only by 10. In a world of zero transaction costs, the
subscriber would be willing to indemnify the ISP for its increase in
expected liability, 10, and, depending on the bargaining power of the
parties, offer the ISP up to 10 in return for a commitment to the optimal level of monitoring. Table 3 summarizes the net value of the two
monitoring technologies.
TABLE

3: NET VALUE OF MoNrroRING TECHNOLOGIES

Monitoring

Technology
A
B

ISP Cost
20+50=70
20+40=60

User Benefit
200(1-0.05)=190
200(1-0.06-0.09)=170

Net Surplus
190-70=120
170-60=110

Despite their mutual interest, the parties may fail to contract effectively on the optimal ISP monitoring policy because of the existence of transaction costs. The market approach should be
to legal liability. This is the standard description of the relationship between third parties
and primary wrongdoers. See generally Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELLJ.
ECON. 120 (1982) (describing the relationship between liability insurers and wrongdoers
along the principal-agent paradigm). This Article highlights the second principal-agent
problem: that the ISP might be too cautious and excessively censor the information that
the subscriber stored on its server.
69
More generally, in the absence of transaction costs the allocation of liability between third parties and primary wrongdoers does not matter. The parties will privately
shift liability to the optimal target. For the application of this insight in the context of
vicarious liability in tort, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1347-49 (1982); and
Sykes, supra note 27, at 1233-79.
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abandoned if altering the rules of ISP liability is cheaper than the cost
faced by the parties in overcoming these transaction costs. 70 In addi-

tion to the standard costs of negotiating the agreement and putting it
into writing, three unique types of transaction costs characterize the
ISP-subscriber relationship, and prevent the parties from contracting
effectively on the level of monitoring exercised by the ISP: ex post
negotiation costs, informational problems, and legal impediments.
1. Ex Post Negotiation Costs
Ex post negotiation costs measure the ability of the parties to negotiate the filtering of specific items rather than general monitoring
policies. In the web-hosting example, the subject of ex post negotiations will be the removal of a specific photograph from the subscriber's website, rather than the overall censorship policy guiding the
ISP. If the parties can negotiate on the terms of each removal, the
subscriber might be able to offer the ISP a payment to induce it to
take into account the benefits of each relevant item. The ability to
negotiate cheaply over specific items also enables the parties to exchange information about the legal status of specific items and to convince the ISP that no legal risk is involved.
The ability to negotiate ex post varies across Internet services. In
the web-hosting case, the parties might find it relatively easy to negotiate about the removal of specific items. This is because the subscriber
will immediately learn about the removal of such items, 7 1 and the ISP
will have only one party with whom to negotiate. By contrast, the cost
of ex post negotiations between Internet access providers and their
subscribers might be prohibitive. Consider the case in which an Internet access provider blocks access to a particular site it suspects to be
engaging in copyright infringement. This decision affects all users
who rely on that ISP to provide them with Internet access. The collective interest of these users, as a group, in having access to this site
might outweigh the ISP's risk of legal liability. Nevertheless, an individual user will decline to take the time and the effort to negotiate
with the ISP and convince it to enable access to the site as long as its
personal stake in access to that site is smaller than the cost of such
70

Cf Kraakman, supra note 31, at 866-67 (making this argument in the context of

managerial liability); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INTr'L REv. L. &
ECON. 239 (1993) (justifying criminal liability of corporate employees when their limited

wealth makes the state, through the use of imprisonment sanctions for unpaid criminal
fines, more effective than employers in providing employees with incentives to avoid
misconduct).
71

See infra text accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing informational problems in ob-

serving removal decisions).
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negotiations. This collective action problem thus substantially in72
creases the cost of negotiating ex post with access providers.
2.

InformationalProblems

Assume that a web-hosting contract specifies the monitoring policy to be adopted by the ISP. Such a contract would identify, for example, the monitoring technology to be adopted by the ISP, and the
conditions under which an item can be removed from the ISP's
server. Once the contract is in effect, however, the ISP has a clear
incentive to renege on its contractual promises and adopt an overly
aggressive monitoring policy in order to minimize its exposure to legal liability. 73 To enforce the ISP's contractual obligations, the subscriber must be able to overcome two informational hurdles: (1)
observe the actual monitoring policy employed by the ISP; and (2)
prove in court that the actual monitoring policy differs from the one
74
agreed upon in the contract.
Observing the actual monitoring policy adopted by the ISP can
be very costly for subscribers. Consider again the web-hosting example. The subscriber will most likely learn about the removal of specific
photographs from her site, but she cannot simply deduce the general
monitoring policy guiding the ISP by merely observing individual removal decisions. Rather, she will have to invest costly time and effort
to uncover the monitoring policy underlying the ISP's specific removal decision. This task would be particularly tricky when monitoring is performed through a combination of technology and human
judgment. 75 Furthermore, whereas subscribers for web-hosting ser72
The costs associated with collective bargaining problems have been relied upon, in
the context of eminent domain, tojustify a liability rule that substitutes court-assessed damages for private bargaining. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra; 85 HAv. L. Rv. 1089, 1106-10
(1972). In our context, this prescription implies that lawmakers should adopt a rule under
which ISPs would compensate users for the wrongful removal of items. As described infra
Part IV.B, however, the law fails to provide such a rule, and in fact grants immunity to ISPs
that remove subscribers' materials.
73 The text relies on the assumption made earlier that the fixed fee is paid at the early
stage of the contract. The analysis also abstracts from mechanisms that might be adopted
by the parties to provide the ISP with self-enforcing incentives to induce it to deliver on its
promise to maintain a relaxed monitoring policy. On the implications of self-enforcing
incentives, such as fee-sharing agreements, for the design of liability, see infra Part III.
74 Economic analysis of principal-agent relationship focuses mostly on the ability of
the principal to observe the agent's conduct. See, e.g., ANDREU MAs-CoLEL. Er AL.,

MICROECONoNc THEORY 482 (1995) (arguing that the ability of the principal to observe

agent effort leads to first-best outcome). However, in the absence of self-enforcing mechanisms, contractual disputes might require not only observability by the principal, but also
legal enforcement, thus requiring the principal to prove its case in court.
75 EBay, for example, employs a combination of automated monitoring and manual
operations to prevent sales that infringe copyright. See Glenn R. Simpson, EBay to Police Site
for Sales of PiratedItems, WA. ST. J., Feb. 28, 2001, at A3.
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vices and people posting items for sale on auction sites might learn
quickly about the removal of their materials from the Internet, subscribers of other services might find it challenging not only to observe
general monitoring policies, but also to learn about specific items
screened out by their ISP. A user may be unaware of her Internet
access provider's decision to block access to a specific web address.
Similarly, employers can block incoming E-mails they deem to be inappropriate without notifying their employees. Outgoing messages
from Microsoft's Hotmail E-mail service, for example, had failed to
reach their destination for several months before subscribers learned
these failures were intentional, part of a filtering policy adopted by
Microsoft. 76 Needless to say, the hurdle of proving the ISP's actual

monitoring policy in court is obviously more difficult to overcome
than the hurdle of privately observing the actual monitoring policy.
3.

Legal Obstacles

The legal system might impose two additional obstacles on private contracting for relaxed monitoring policies. First, contractual
commitment to limit monitoring and censorship effort undermines
the ISP's position in future litigation over its failure to remove infringing material. It would be an uphill battle for an ISP to argue convincingly that it did all that it could to prevent misconduct by users when,
in its contract with users, it promised not to engage in fierce
77
monitoring.
Second, the legal system might impose difficulties on users trying
to sue ISPs for damages associated with removing their materials from
the Internet. Both the Digital Millennium Copyright Act78 and the
Communications Decency Act, 79 for example, grant ISPs effective immunity from liability for the removal of materials suspected of being
76
In its effort to fight spain, Microsoft has blocked outgoing mails from its Hotmail
service to websites hosted by ISPs who were commonly associated with spam. Lisa M. Bowman, Hotmail Spare Filters Block OutgoingE-Mai4 CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 18, 2001, at http://
news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-201-4523924-O.html. Microsoft did not inform its users about
its policy. Id. This policy was discovered only several months after it had been adopted.
See id.
77
In the Netcom case, for example, plaintiffs posited that Netcom, a provider of webhosting services, developed a reputation for its refusal to monitor against copyright infringement and advertised promising "a regulation-free" service. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Plaintiffs asked
the court to rely on these arguments to find that Netcom has a financial interest in the
infringing activity of its subscribers and thus hold it vicariously liable for copyright infringement. See id. The court, however, held that such facts do not establish the requisite "financial interest." Id.
78
17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (Supp. V 1999).
79 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. V 1999).
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unlawful.8 0 This immunity further decreases the likelihood that subscribers would succeed in making ISPs adopt optimal censorship and
filtering policies.
B.

Market Incentives and the Restrictive Approach
The market approach is misguided because it overlooks the con-

tractual impediments that prevent the parties from successfully tackling the overdeterrence problem. The restrictive approach, by
contrast, overlooks the role of market incentives in mitigating the
overdeterrence phenomenon. Two mechanisms may operate to align
the incentives of the ISPs and subscribers: (1) contractual incentives;
and (2) competition in the market for Internet services.
1.

ContractualIncentives

The parties might be able to structure a spectrum of contractual
incentives to induce ISPs to behave in an optimal manner. The economic theory of contracts explores in depth various contractual solu81
tions to the divergence of incentives between principals and agents.
The benchmark mechanism for inducing the ISP to exercise optimal
monitoring is providing it with the right to the residual revenues generated by the website, and leaving the subscriber with a fixed income. 82 This mechanism is self-enforcing, and eliminates the need
for acquiring information about the ISP's actual monitoring policy.
It is highly unlikely that the risk of liability will be powerful
83
enough to induce ISPs and subscribers to adopt this radical solution.
Nevertheless, some Internet services might exhibit, due to various business considerations, profit-sharing arrangements between subscribers
For a review of the relevant sections and their implications, see infra notes 171-78
80
and accompanying text.
81 For a general overview, see MAs-CoLELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 477-88.
82 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. Rxv. 777, 793 (1972); Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a
Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 79 (1999).
83 This benchmark mechanism is unlikely to be adopted for several reasons. First, it
creates a parallel moral hazard problem that might prove to be more severe than the ISP
overcompliance problem. To ensure that subscribers put forth sufficient efforts to attract
traffic to their websites, an ISP would be forced to monitor its subscribers' activities. Given
that business considerations dictate the structure under which the website owner contracts
with the service provider with a fixed fee, this reverse moral hazard problem is probably
more severe than the one produced by ISP liability. Finally, this solution is inapplicable in
the context of Internet access providers, and in any other scenario in which the subscriber
does not contract with the ISP for commercial purposes. More generally, this Article assumes that changes in legal rules would not affect the ways in which the parties structure
their transactions. See supra note 64 (making the assumption that a firm's decision to contract for services rather than perform them internally is unlikely to be affected by considerations of expected liability).
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and ISPs. Consider the case of auction websites. 84 These sites charge
fees that vary in proportion to the sale price of the items sold through
the site. Profit-sharing agreements of this type constitute a self-enforcing mechanism to mitigate the divergence of incentives between the
parties. Each item removed by the auctioning website produces a revenue loss in proportion to the value of the item removed. Thus, with
some adjustments in the magnitude of the penalties, imposing strict
85
liability on auction websites may result in optimal monitoring effort.
2.

Competition

Competition in the market for Internet services indeed constrains
ISP overdeterrence. 8 6 To illustrate, consider two ISPs competing in
the market for hosting services: "Censorlink, Inc." and "Zero Policing,
Inc." If Censorlink goes too far in censoring materials, subscribers
might switch to Zero Policing, who would employ less stringent monitoring policies and charge subscribers higher fees. However, as in the
context of the shareholder-manager agency problem, competition
cannot fully eliminate the divergence of incentives between ISPs and
87
their subscribers.
Two major obstacles limit the extent to which competition in the
market for Internet services can align the incentives of service providers and subscribers: (1) transaction costs; and (2) the limited significance of monitoring in choosing Internet service providers. To begin,
subscribers will switch from Censorlink to Zero Policing only if they
expect Zero Policing to monitor less aggressively than Censorlink.
But sheer contractual promises cannot credibly commit Zero Policing
to a monitoring policy that would be less stringent than the one
adopted by Censorlink, because the transaction costs that prevent ISPs
84 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the optimal liability of auction websites). Note, however, that existing legal rules may increase the cost of profit-sharing arrangements. By
sharing in the profits of its subscribers, an ISP might be found vicariously liable for copyright infringement. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the doctrine of vicarious infringement).
85 This logic might also explain why the risk of excessive censorship is less significant
in the analogous context of newspaper publishers, who face strict liability for the defaming
stories of their reporters. Like ISPs, newspaper publishers are induced by the threat of
liability to censor the speech of others, their reporters. Unlike ISPs, however, newspaper
publishers, and not their reporters, derive most of the residual gains associated with the
information published in the newspaper. But seeJ.M. Balkin, Free Speech and HostileEnvironments, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295, 2301 (1999) (explaining the imposition of strict liability on
newspaper publishers and publishing houses as an extension of vicarious liability in torts).
86 Cf MarkJ. Roe, Rents and Their CorporateConsequences, 53 STAN. L. Rxv. 1463 (2001)
(exploring the effect of the degree of competition in the market for products on the magnitude of the incentive divergence between managers and shareholders of public
corporations).
87 Cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State
Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HaRv. L. REv. 1435, 1462-70 (1992) (reviewing the limited
effect of market competition on the managerial agency problem in the context of incorporation decisions).
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and subscribers from contracting on ISP monitoring policies characterize all ISPs offering similar services. To lure the subscribers of Censorlink, Zero Policing would thus have to establish a reputation for lax
monitoring policies.8 8 Such reputation, however, is not only difficult
89
to establish, but also puts the ISP at a greater risk of legal liability.
Even when subscribers can differentiate between ISPs based on
their monitoring policies, competition might not necessarily result in
the transition of subscribers to Zero Policing. ISPs compete not only
on monitoring policies but also, and more importantly, on aspects
such as the quality of their network, bandwidth, and prices. The best
ISPs in terms of quality of services and bandwidth might be the ones
employing the most cautious monitoring policies. Moreover, many
Internet services, especially Internet access, are provided incidentally
to another transaction or service. American universities, for example,
usually provide their students and faculty with Internet access, and so
do many workplaces with respect to their employees. Because the
quality of Internet services is not the major factor in choosing an academic institution, universities face virtually no market incentives to
converge on the optimal level of monitoring.9 0
Finally, even under the assumption that Zero Policing monitors
less aggressively, a Censorlink subscriber will not switch to Zero Policing unless the switching cost is smaller than the expected value of the
relaxed monitoring policy.9 1
To be sure, ISPs cannot go too far. Adopting an extremely overzealous monitoring policy increases the likelihood of subscribers' being informed about such policy, and might thus create a negative
reputation for an ISP, which in turn would encourage its users to exSee generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance,89J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (exploring the conditions for effective
reputation-building).
89 See supra note 77. Moreover, ISPs with reputations for relaxed monitoring policies
might attract many subscribers with unlawful intentions. This will increase expected liability costs for the ISP, which in turn will increase the fees they charge their users. As a result,
legitimate Internet users unwilling to pay high fees will switch to ISPs that employ relatively
stringent monitoring policies.
It seems that the major constraint on adopting overly restrictive censorship policies
90
by academic institutions is the risk of adverse publicity. When the Napstercasewas still at its
early stages, many universities blocked their students' access to Napster's site. See John
Borland, Metallica, Dr.Dre Urge Colleges to Cut NapsterAccess, CNET NEWs.coM, Sept. 8, 2000
(reporting that, out of fifty universities surveyed, thirty-four percent blocked access to Napster), at http://news.cnet.com/nes/0-1005-200-2728170.html. Once the interest of the
media intensified, universities declined music industry requests to block such access. See
Sam Costello, Reading, Writing, and Napster,INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 22, 2000 (reporting
the refusal of universities to block access to Napster due to concerns over censorship and
academic freedom), at http://Nwv.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1902,18790,00.
html.
91 In the web-hosting example, the subscriber will switch ISPs only if switching costs
are lower than 10.
88
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periment with other service providers. In the web-hosting example, if
overzealous monitoring is sufficiently costly, companies might opt to
bear the cost of shifting to in-house web-hosting. Even in the case of
incidental providers of Internet services-universities, for examplesufficiently large losses produced by excessive monitoring will make
some users access the Internet through commercial ISPs.
To summarize, both categorical approaches, the market and the
restrictive approach, should be rejected. Ex ante, subscribers and service providers would like to adopt the desirable level of screening.
Various impediments, however, limit the ability of these parties to
achieve the desirable outcome. The nature and the magnitude of the
overdeterrence phenomenon vary across different types of services offered by third parties. As the next Part shows, these differences reflect
on the optimal legal solution to the overdeterrence problem.
III
LEGAL STRATEGIES

Given the overdeterrence associated with strict liability, this Part
explores three distinct models of legal response aimed at facilitating
an optimal regime of ISP liability notwithstanding the divergence of
incentives between ISPs and their subscribers. These models include:
(1) scaling down penalties imposed on ISPs under strict liability; (2)
regulating the ISP-subscriber interface; and (3) making the state specify the required level of ISP monitoring, either through "negligencebased" standards, or through a "monitoring-regulation" regime.
These models differ in the strategy they adopt to alleviate the risk of
overdeterrence. The analysis will explore the strengths and vices of
each model, and evaluate their prospects of securing the optimal level
of ISP monitoring and censorship.
A.

Strict Liability with Scaled-Down Penalties

At first glance, the response to the overdeterrence produced by
the divergence of incentives between ISPs and their subscribers
should be simple. The best response, one might argue, is to impose
strict liability on ISPs but reduce the magnitude of penalties they will
have to pay. 92 This response, the argument goes, would maintain the
informational advantages of strict liability, but eliminate the risk of
overdeterrence. 93 This argument, though initially appealing to the economically oriented mind, is misguided. Reducing the penalties
92 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff, supra note 41, at 886-88 (calling
for decreasing the magnitude of penalties to cope with overdeterrence produced by defendants' risk aversion).
93 On the informational advantages of strict liability, see supra text accompanying
notes 46-47.
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under strict liability would achieve optimal deterrence only under very
limited circumstances, namely, where profit-sharing agreements exist
between ISPs and subscribers.
To examine the effect of combining strict liability with reduced
penalties, let us return to our web-hosting example. In that example,
the underlying assumption was that the ISP is paid a fixed fee and
thus derives no marginal benefit from an increase in the number of
photographs posted by the subscriber. That being the case, the ISP
overdeterrence phenomenon would persist as long as the penalties
imposed on the ISP are positive. This is because, at the margin, removing photographs is costless whereas liability costs are positive.
Stated differently, the ISP loses nothing from removing subscriber
photographs from its servers up to the point where overly aggressive
censorship would induce subscribers to take their business elsewhere.
On the other hand, each additional photograph suspected of being
infringing increases the ISP's exposure to liability. Thus, as long as its
actions do not induce its subscribers to switch service providers, the
ISP would rather remove suspected photographs than face penalties,
however small they might be. Scaling down the penalties for strict
94
liability would therefore fail to ensure optimal deterrence.
Strict liability with scaled-down penalties will result in optimal deterrence only when, at the margin, the ISP suffers a loss from removing each additional item from its servers. This can be illustrated by
modifying the web-hosting example to make the ISP capture a proportion of the benefit produced by the materials posted on its servers.
Consider again our web-hosting example but assume that, under the
web-hosting agreement, the ISP is entitled to ten percent of the revenue derived by the subscriber from operating the site. In this modified example, the ISP does bear a cost, on the margin, for each item it
decides to remove from its servers because any single item screened
out by the ISP would reduce its expected revenue. The only remaining difficulty is that the loss suffered by the ISP is smaller than the
actual loss borne by the subscriber. This problem, however, can be
solved by scaling down the penalty imposed on the ISP. In our example, it can be easily shown that imposing a penalty of no more than
200 would induce the ISP to adopt the optimal monitoring technology, A.95 Furthermore, as the analysis below regarding the liability of
94 My argument, it should be emphasized, is not that reducing penalties will have no
effect on ISPs. Reducing penalties will reduce the magnitude of overdeterrence because
ISPs will compare the magnitude of the penalty to their loss from losing subscribers. All
that I argue is that reducing penalties cannot achieve optimal deterrence.
95 When the penalty equals 220, the ISP's expected costs under Technology A equal
its expected costs under Technology B. Under Technology A, expected fees from posting
an additional photograph are 10% x 200 x (1 - 0.05) = 19. Expected liability costs are 0.05
x 200 = 10, and the actual cost of monitoring is 20. The total value of Technology A is thus

932

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:901

auction sites will demonstrate, 96 the conditions under which reducing
penalties would be optimal are not only a matter of theory. Rather,
they would apply whenever the fees paid to the ISP are based on the
profit-sharing model.
It should be noted, however, that combining strict liability with
scaled-down penalties somewhat undermines the informational advantages of strict liability over negligence. To be sure, courts would not
have to compare the ISP's actual monitoring policy with the socially
optimal one. However, the institution setting the modified penalties-whether courts or legislators-would have to verify the socially
optimal level of monitoring in order to deduce the necessary modifi97
cations in the magnitude of penalties.
B.

ISP-Subscriber Interface Regulation

As explained in Part II, the divergence of incentives between ISPs
and their subscribers is the outcome of various impediments to the
ability of the parties to contract on the optimal level of monitoring.
The strategy outlined in this subpart seeks to alleviate overdeterrence
by directly regulating the relationship between subscribers and ISPs to
reduce their incentive divergence. This model of legal response does
not exclude other legal strategies, and could be combined with other
measures such as monitoring regulation to eliminate misconduct without producing overdeterrence.
Through regulation, lawmakers can impose uniform measures
that will reduce the cost of transacting over monitoring policy and
facilitate negotiation between service providers and their subscribers.
For example, the law could require providers of web-hosting services
to notify subscribers immediately whenever they decide to remove
materials from their servers. Likewise, the law could require the providers of Internet access services to notify their users whenever they
decide to block their access to a particular site. Such a notification
requirement would have two potential effects. First, it would decrease
the cost for subscribers of learning about such removal. As mentioned earlier, the lack of information about removal decisions by ISPs
impedes the ability of the parties to alleviate privately the overdeterrence problem. 98 Also, expecting their censorship decisions to become immediately known to subscribers, ISPs might be less eager to
remove materials from the Internet. Second, an immediate notifica19 - 10 - 20 = -11. Under Technology B, expected fees are 10% x 200 x (1 - 0.06 - 0.09) =
17. Expected liability costs are 0.04 x 200 = 8, and the actual cost of monitoring is 20. The
total value of Technology B is thus 17 - 8 - 20 = -11.
96 See infra Part IV.C.
97 In addition, the institution setting the penalties would have to obtain information
about the fraction of the social loss borne by the ISP.
98 See supraPart II.A.2.
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toring beyond the level set by the courts increases cost but does not
reduce expected liability. 10 5
3.

Regulation vs. Negligence

Both monitoring-regulation and negligence-based regimes avoid
overdeterrence by requiring ISPs to comply with an externally determined standard of monitoring. 0 6 The regimes differ, however, in the
identity of the institution setting the required level of monitoring. Accordingly, the choice between regulation and negligence largely depends on the respective abilities of lawmakers and courts to determine
accurately the optimal level of monitoring. While this Article does not
advance a definitive position on the identity of the institution better
positioned to identify the optimal level of monitoring, I would like to
highlight several important considerations in determining whether
negligence or regulation is most suitable in the ISP context, where
rapid technological advancements constantly affect the optimal level
10 7
of monitoring.
In the short run, a monitoring-regulation regime provides greater
certainty and thus decreases the likelihood of overdeterrence. As new
technologies emerge, courts will struggle to set the optimal level of
monitoring, and the likelihood of contradictory verdicts is substantial.
Because ISPs would be imperfectly informed about what courts would
determine to be the optimal level of monitoring, they would tend to
reduce their exposure to liability by engaging in excessive monitoring
policies. Conversely, explicitly specifying the optimal level of monitoring through regulation provides ISPs with superior information and
reduces the risk of inconsistent verdicts. In the long run, in contrast,
after the pace of technological change has slowed, industry standards
are likely to emerge and courts are more likely to converge on the
optimal level of monitoring even under a negligence standard.
105 However, once the assumption of full information is relaxed, negligence standards
would result in overcompliance in a greater magnitude than would first-party negligence
standards. On the tendency of negligence standards to overdeter under conditions of imperfect information, see Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrenceand Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 279, 279-80 (1986); and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Accuracy in theDeterminationof Liability, 37J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-3 (1994). Given the divergence
of incentives between ISPs and their users, this overdeterrence effect would be exacerbated
with respect to ISPs, but would be minimized by employing negligence standards combined with reduced penalties.
106 Both regimes also differ from strict liability in their effect on the scale of services
provided by ISPs. See supra Part I.B.
107 An additional consideration affecting the choice: regulations can be easily avoided
when lawmakers fail to capture all relevant dimensions of care within the relevant regulation. For an analysis of the choice between legal rules and legal standards, see generally
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE LJ. 557 (1992).
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On the other hand, the rapid pace of technological change might
make negligence superior to regulation. When monitoring technologies constantly evolve, there is a risk that a standard set by lawmakers
would become obsolete by the time it is applied by courts. Assigning
the power to set monitoring standards to courts, by contrast, enables
them to modify the optimal level of monitoring according to technological developments.

10 8

4. Knowledge-Contingent Standards
I conclude the review of legal responses by discussing knowledgecontingent standards. Academics have often advocated knowledgecontingent standards as a response to overdeterrence.' 0 9 However, although knowledge-contingent standards indeed avoid overdeterrence, they also encourage ISPs to ignore subscriber misconduct.
Thus, knowledge-contingent standards should only be applied in conjunction with a monitoring-regulation regime.
Knowledge-contingent standards impose liability on ISPs only for
their failure to remove materials they know to be illegal. 110 This
would eliminate the overdeterrence problem simply by exempting
ISPs from liability for their failure to acquire information about their
users' conduct. Consider a regime under which the only duty imposed on ISPs is to remove materials that they know to be illegal.
Under this strictly knowledge-contingent regime, ISPs have no reason
to investigate the nature of the information disseminated through
their networks, and the risk of excessive monitoring is eliminated. To
be sure, some level of overdeterrence might persist if courts err in
inferring knowledge, or if ISPs are too cautious in removing materials
when they cannot determine with certainty that these materials are
legitimate. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this overdeterrence phe108 But see Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 279 (1974) (describing common-law judicial process as too slow to
keep up with the need for legal change resulting from growth in economic activity).
109
See Yen, supra note 14, at 1892 ("Whatever the wrongs embodied in copyright infringement, they are not serious enough to warrant ISP liability unless knowing assistance
in that infringement is present."); cf. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, AntitrustIntent, 74
S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 680-81 (2001) (positing that intent standards are necessary to prevent
both overdeterrence and underdeterrence in the antitrust context). In his gatekeeper paper, Kraakman discussed the role of scienter standards in third-party liability. See Kraakman, supra note 27, at 76; see alsoJackson, supra note 33, at 1057 (exploring the role of
knowledge standards in governing the liability of lawyers for the misconduct of their
clients).
110
This is usually achieved by imposing liability only on ISPs that "knowingly" failed to
take the necessary steps to prevent misconduct. The DMCA, for example, precludes monetary liability of hosting-services providers that have no knowledge of subscriber infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (3) (B) (Supp. V 1999).
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tion requirement would facilitate ex post negotiation between the parties over the fate of particular items. For example, once notified
about such removal, a subscriber who believed that an item was legal
could convey information about the legal status of the item to the ISP.
The most prominent statute governing ISP liability, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),g9 has partially adopted the regulation model suggested by this section. The DMCA provides an elaborate set of regulations affecting the cost of contracting over censorship
practices between ISPs and their subscribers and regulates the level of
policing by ISPs. 10 0 However, as will be explained below, 1° 1 the
DMCA has not gone far enough in alleviating the impediments to
contracting.
C.

Monitoring Standards

The conventional endorsement of strict liability is premised on
the recognition that wrongdoers are best positioned to determine the
optimal level of care because they capture both social harm and social
benefit. Part I has shown that this premise does not apply to ISPs.
The strategy explored in this subpart renders the divergence of incentives between ISPs and their subscribers irrelevant for ISP monitoring
decisions by granting the state the power to set the required level of
ISP monitoring. This strategy can take two doctrinal forms: monitoring-regulation and negligence-based standards.
1. MonitoringRegulation
A monitoring-regulation regime assigns lawmakers, rather than
ISPs, the task of setting the optimal level of monitoring. This regime
would impose liability on ISPs for user misconduct only when they
failed to meet monitoring standards set by regulators. 10 2 An ISP that
satisfies the level of monitoring set by lawmakers will not be liable for
the misconduct of its subscribers.
A monitoring-regulation regime eliminates overdeterrence by
making the divergence of incentives between ISPs and their subscribers irrelevant for ISPs' decision to monitor. This is because the
99
100
101

1V.B.

17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. V 1999).
See id.

For a discussion of the interface-regulation aspects of the DMCA, see infra Part

102 A monitoring-regulation regime might also impose penalties for failure to meet
monitoring standards in the absence of harm. The rules governing the sale of alcohol to
minors serve as a good example for such regimes. Sellers must ask for identification before
each sale of alcohol. Failure to ask for age documents will result in penalties even if the
customer turns out to be an adult. For a general analysis of the choice between liability for
harm versus ex ante regulation, see Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of
Safety, 13J. LEGAL SrUD. 357 (1984).
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calculus of ISPs under this regime differs from their calculus under
strict liability. Under strict liability, ISPs would have to identify the
optimal level of monitoring by comparing the full social harm produced by subscriber misconduct to the cost of monitoring and the loss
produced by screening out materials. In contrast, under a monitoring-regulation regime, ISPs would compare the cost of complying with
the regulation with the expected liability for failure to comply. An ISP
would have no incentives to monitor beyond the level specified by
lawmakers because the marginal increase in monitoring cost would
10 3
exceed the marginal saving in liability costs.

A monitoring-regulation regime requires lawmakers to acquire
information not only about the social harm of user misconduct, but
also about the actual cost of monitoring, its effectiveness in detecting
misconduct, and its effect on legitimate conduct. To be sure, legislators are likely to err in setting the optimal level of monitoring. But as
long as they are better positioned than ISPs to determine that level,
regulation is superior to strict ISP liability.
2.

Negligence

Negligence-based standards serve as the traditional remedy for
10 4
overdeterrence problems associated with "positive externalities."
Under a negligence regime of ISP liability, the optimal level of monitoring would be specified by courts, so that service providers will be
held liable for the misconduct of their subscribers only if they fail to
meet that standard. An ISP whose actual monitoring policies equal,
or exceed, the level set by the courts will be exempted from liability.
Like the monitoring-regulation regime, a negligence-based approach does not rely on defendants to calculate the optimal level of
monitoring. Instead, courts will determine the optimal level of monitoring by taking into account the social harm produced by user misconduct, the actual cost of monitoring, its effectiveness in detecting
misconduct, and its effect on legitimate conduct. If courts succeed in
specifying the socially desirable level of monitoring, ISPs will have no
incentive to monitor excessively because increasing the level of moni103
Similarly, ISPs would have no incentive to adopt suboptimal monitoring policies
because the expected liability resulting from failure to satisfy regulatory monitoring requirements would exceed the savings in monitoring costs.
104
See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 729-37 (5th ed. Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1998) (endorsing the adoption of negligence standards for libel, among other

harmful forms of speech, because of the external benefits of speech); Hylton, supra note

58, at 984 (positing that when external benefits are present, "[a] negligence rule, which
would not internalize all victim losses, may be socially preferable precisely because it fails to
have the same taxing effect on the activity level as would a strict liability rule"); Katyal,
supra note 4, at 1095-1101 (advocating the use of negligence standards to cope with the
risk of overdeterrence produced by network effects).
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nomenon will most likely be smaller than its magnitude under strict
liability."'
One might argue that even a regime based purely on knowledge
standards would fail to eliminate the overdeterrence problem. The
analysis so far has focused on the effect of third-party liability on the
level of monitoring by the ISP. In theory, however, the divergence of
incentives associated with the third party-primary wrongdoer relationship could lead to overdeterrence even under conditions of fall information. Consider again the web-hosting example, and assume that
there is no doubt that a given statement posted on the site is false and
thus libelous. The website owner would remove such a statement
from her site only if the expected harm of libel exceeded her expected benefits from posting the statement. The ISP, by contrast,
does not take the benefits produced by posting the statement into account, and thus might remove the statement, even if its value exceeds
the cost of libelous publication.
This argument is valid, however, only under the assumption that
the value that the subscriber derives from posting statements on the
Internet is distributed across false statements in the following way. If
the value of posting some libelous statements exceeds the social harm
associated with libel, and the value of posting other libelous statements is dearly outweighed by the cost of libel, then conventional economic theory suggests that the use of penalties equal to social harm
would induce wrongdoers to post statements of the former type and
remove statements of the latter type. However, because the third
party, the ISP, does not capture the full value of the conduct at stake,
making it pay for the full social harm would result in overdeterrence,
even under a regime based on knowledge standards.
In most instances of online misconduct, however, the conduct at
stake seems to be strictly undesirable under conditions of full information; that is, the benefit derived from the conduct is always lower than
the resulting social harm. For example, it is difficult to imagine circumstances under which the social benefit of a clearly false statement
exceeds the harm produced by its publication. Hence, the ISP
overdeterrence effect would most likely be limited to the monitoring
policies adopted by ISPs, and the ensuing amount of true statements
removed from the Internet. Stated differently, there is no concern of
overdeterrence with respect to materials known to be illegal.

111 This problem could also be solved through the adoption of a narrow formulation
of the governing "knowledge" standard. SeeYen, supranote 14, at 1877 ("If either [a formally filed] complaint or [an ISP's subsequent] investigation reveals a 'colorable' claim of
noninfringement, the ISP need not worry about contributory liability because the required
knowledge does not exist.").
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At the same time, however, the advantage of knowledge-contingent standards of third-party liability, their elimination of monitoring
incentives, is also their major flaw. Knowledge-contingent standards
not only eliminate incentives to monitor, but also create incentives for
ISPs to maintain their ignorance to minimize their liability exposure. 112 An optimal regime of ISP liability should thus combine
knowledge-contingent and monitoring-regulation standards. To illustrate, consider the liability of web-hosting service providers for a defamatory statement posted on a subscriber's site. Under such a
combined regime, the ISPs would be subjected to regulations specifying the extent to which they should monitor their servers to determine whether the materials posted by subscribers are defamatory. An
ISP's failure to satisfy the monitoring requirements set forth in the
regulations will expose it to liability for libel. These monitoring regulations would be supplemented with a rule under which an ISP would
be liable for libel whenever it knew about a defamatory statement and
failed to remove it from its servers. The interaction of knowledgecontingent standards and a monitoring-regulation regime would
therefore lead to optimal deterrence.
IV
APPLICATIONS

The framework developed in the preceding Parts provides illuminating insights about intriguing features of third-party liability regimes outside the Internet context. Examples include the threetiered regime of liability for libel, 113 the distinction between producers and distributors of child pornography, 1 4 and employer liability
112 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, EBay Says Law DiscouragesAuction Monitoring,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 1999 (reporting that eBay deliberately avoids screening auctions before they appear
online to avoid knowledge-contingent liability under the DMCA), at http://
wv.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/12/cyber/articles/lOebay.html. The perverse incentives to acquire information produced by knowledge-contingent standards are well recognized by the literature on mistake of law as a criminal defense. See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies,
The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DuKE LJ. 341,
385 (1998) ("The inevitable drawback of any rule excusing criminal liability for a lack of
knowledge of the law is that such a rule celebrates ignorance of the law while making
knowledge of it the best and fastest ticket to a prison cell.").
113 The common law of defamation distinguishes between three types of defendants.
"Common carriers" (such as telephone companies) are not liable for defamation. "Distributors" of published material, such as bookstore owners, are liable only when they have
actual knowledge of the defaming nature of the publication. "Publishers," by contrast, will
be held liable for defamation regardless of their state of mind. See, e.g., Waldman, supra
note 26, 33.
114 See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 67-78 (1994) (interpreting the relevant statute to require knowledge of minority status by child pornography
distributor in order to avoid constitutional challenges); Gilmour v. Rogerson, 117 F.3d 368,
372-73 (8th Cir. 1997) (imposing strict liability on a producer of sexually explicit materials
depicting minors).
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for sexual harassment. 115 Broader implications notwithstanding, this
Part utilizes the incentive-divergence thesis to shed light on three spe-

cific aspects of third-party liability in cyberspace. First, I show how
recognizing the incentive-divergence problem illuminates the complex doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement, and explains its
role in the Napsterdecisions. Next, I evaluate the regime of ISP liability under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 116 Finally, I outline

the desirable liability regime for auction sites.
The discussion below does not seek to cover all instances of thirdparty liability in cyberspace."17 Indeed, the thesis underlying this Arti-

cle is that no single regime could be crafted to cope with all types of
subscriber misconduct. Rather, an optimal regime of ISP liability
should be tailored according to the nature of the service at stake and
the type of subscriber misconduct involved. As Part II has shown, the

nature of the service offered by the ISP affects the degree to which the
parties can contractually overcome their divergence of incentives.
The type of subscriber misconduct in turn dictates the ability of the
ISP effectively to detect unlawful conduct by its subscribers. 118 Given

the difficulty of devising a single regime of ISP liability, my goal in this
Part is to merely illustrate the illuminative implications of the incentive-divergence thesis for understanding current doctrine, and designing optimal regimes, of ISP liability.

115 See generally Balkin, supra note 85 (discussing sexual harassment in the workplace);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, HarassmentLaw, and the Clinton Administration,
LAw & CoNrMsp. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 299 (discussing sexual harassment ef-

fected through the Internet).
116 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. V 1999).
117 The list of subscriber misconducts for which ISPs might be liable continues to expand. See, e.g., Lonn Weissblum, Comment, Incitement to Violence on the World Wide Web: Can
Web PublishersSeek First Amendment Refuge?, 6 MIcH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 52-57
(2000) (analyzing civil and criminal liability of websites publishing instructions for bomb
making).
118 As mentioned above, extending liability to ISPs is justified only under the assumption that they are positioned to prevent subscriber misconduct at a relatively low cost. See
supra text accompanying notes 33-36. To illustrate the interaction of the nature of the
misconduct and monitoring costs, consider the difference between defamation and hate
speech. An operator of online chat rooms can relatively easily detect most messages containing hateful content through a basic textual search. On the phenomenon of online
hate, see Lisa Guernsey, MainstreamSites Serve as Portalsto Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at
GI. In contrast, as the sheer reading of a message cannot reveal whether it is true or false,
the cost of detecting a defaming message by the operator of online chat rooms might be
prohibitive. Legal context also determines other important aspects, such as the optimal
role of victim care in preventing subscriber misconduct. For a discussion of the role of
victim care in the prevention of copyright infringement, see infra text accompanying notes
186-87.
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A. Vicarious Infringement: A New Approach
The doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement, which has occupied a key role in the attempts of content providers to hold ISPs
liable for subscriber copyright infringement, 19 is in disarray. The
conflicting interpretations of this doctrine are best illustrated by the
diametrically opposed positions of the Ninth Circuit and the district
court in the Napster case regarding the scope of Napster's vicarious
liability for copyright infringement.1 20 In this subpart, I uncover a
new rationale underlying this important doctrine. 12 1 This new understanding, I believe, will enable courts to apply the vicarious infringement doctrine to ISPs in a principled, coherent manner.
Under the commonly accepted rationale, the goal of vicarious infringement is to go beyond the technical definitions of direct copyright infringement and identify the party that should internalize the
social cost of infringement. In this section, however, I suggest an alternative rationale for vicarious infringement. Under this new understanding, an alternative objective of vicarious infringement is to
provide third parties with incentives to police infringement while
eliminating the risk of overdeterrence due to the divergence of incentives between primary wrongdoers and third parties. While the current rationale might account for the contours of vicarious
infringement in many other contexts, it is this new rationale that
should inform the application of the doctrine to ISPs.
119 For a review of pre-Napster decisions struggling with the application of vicarious
liability to ISPs, see Yen, supra note 14, at 1843-48. The doctrine of vicarious liability continues to occupy an important role in the post-Napsterera. For example, in a recent complaint, members of the music and movie industries argue that several companies operating
peer-to-peer file-trading services vicariously infringe their copyrights. See Complaint for
Damages and Injunctive Relief for Copyright Infringement, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., No. 01-08541 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2, 2001), availableat http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
seminar/intemet-client/readings/week8/complaint.pdf; Lee Gomes, Entertainment Industry Sues to Curtail Web Music-SharingMorpheus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2001, at B9.
120 SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), affginpart
and rev'g in part 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The Napsterdecision raises signifi-

cant questions over the future of digital music and the proper scope of intellectual property protections. In this Article, however, I abstract from these substantive issues and
analyze the methods of enforcement employed by the courts under the assumption that
Napster's users commit infringement when they use the service. For scholarship on the
implications of the case for digital distribution of music, see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The
CreativeDestruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics ofDigitalTechnology, 69 U. CHI.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2002); and Alfred C. Yen, A PreliminaryEconomic Analysis of Napster:
Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining,26 U. DAYrON

L. REV. 247, 263-76 (2001).
121 Traditional doctrines of copyright enforcement maintain their importance despite
the enactment of the DMCA. First, for example, although the DMCA provides ISPs with
safe havens from liability, an ISP that fails to qualify for such immunity will have its liability
determined by the traditional rules of copyright liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (Supp. V.
1999). Second, the DMCA's definition of "service provider" does not cover all types of
Internet services. See § 512(k) (1).

20021

1.

WHO'S LIABLE FOR CYBERWRONGS?
The Legal Landscape: Broad vs. Narrow Approach

Napster provided its subscribers with the ability to locate and
share MP3 files. 122 A full description of the Napster system is beyond
the scope of this Article. 123 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note
24
that Napster did not store the relevant MP3 files on its servers.'
Rather, it maintained a list containing the names of MP3 files available for downloading at any given time, and the Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses from which they could be downloaded.' 25
Several major record companies sued Napster on the grounds
that its service constitutes vicarious (and contributory) infringement
of their copyrighted music.'

26

Both the district court and the Ninth

Circuit issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Napster from facili12 7
tating the downloading of copyrighted music through its servers.
These courts, however, held different positions with regard to the
scope of this injunction. The district court refused to examine Napster's argument that it is implausible to distinguish legal and nonlegal
downloads, and ruled that Napster must screen out all infringing files
128
on its server, regardless of its ability to identify them as infringing.
The Ninth Circuit remanded and instructed the district court to issue
a new injunction. 129 The new injunction, held the Ninth Circuit,
would have to take into consideration the limited ability of Napster to
distinguish infringing and non-infringing files given the architecture
of its system.'8 0 Concretely, the Ninth Circuit noted that Napster does
not store the files on its servers and therefore it is able to detect infringement based only on the names given by subscribers to the files
they offer for downloading. 13 1 Thus, Napster incurs liability for infringement only if copyright holders provide Napster with notices of
32
infringing files that the ISP does not then remove.'
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1011.
For such a description, see Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window onto the
Future of Copyright Law in the Internet Age 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 755,
759-62 (2000).
124 Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d at 1011-13.
125 Id. at 1012.
126
Id. at 1010-11; A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D.
122
123

Cal. 2000).

See Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d at 1029; Napster,Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
Napster,Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926-27.
Napster,Inc., 239 F.2d at 1029.
130 See id. at 1023-24 (noting that the district court failed to recognize that Napster's
ability to control subscriber infringement is "cabined by the system's current
architecture").
131
See id- at 1024 (stating that "the file name indices... are within the 'premises' that
Napster has the ability to police").
132
See id. at 1027. The district court then issued a new injunction based on the instructions of the Ninth Circuit. SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. C 99-05183 MHP,
C 00-1369 MHP, 2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001). As of March 15, 2001, prelimi127
128
129
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The opposing views expressed by these courts echo an old dispute over the proper boundaries of vicarious infringement. Copyright law recognizes three avenues for holding a party liable for
copyright infringement: direct, contributory, and vicarious liability.
Direct infringement occurs when a party makes a copy of the copyrighted work, i.e., exercises one of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights without permission.1 33 Making unauthorized copies of a music
CD for commercial purposes would constitute a paradigmatic example of direct infringement. The standard governing direct infringement is strict liability, so that neither knowledge nor intent is required
34
to find a party liable under this doctrine.'
Despite statutory silence regarding third-party liability, 135 courts
have recognized two types of third-party liability for copyright infringement-contributory and vicarious liability. To establish contributory liability, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the third party
must cause or contribute to the infringing activity; 136 and (2) the third
party must know or have reason to know about the primary wrongdoer's infringing conduct. 137 Examples of contributory liability include the furnishing of infringing videotapes to another for purposes
nary reports indicted that Napster has blocked the exchange of more than one-half of the
files. John Borland, Napster Filters More than Half of Downloads, CNEr NEWS.COM, Mar. 15,
2001, at http://nes.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-5149337.html. At the time that this Article was submitted for publication, the parties were still litigating over the proper scope of
the preliminary injunction and the extent to which Napster complies with its requirements. See Matt Richtel, Napster Appeals an Order to Remain Closed Down, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13,
2001, at C4; Matt Richtel, Napster Wins a Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2001, at C4 (reporting
recent developments in this dispute).
133
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright
owners); id. § 501 (a) (Supp. V 1999) (stating that infringement occurs when alleged infringer violates at least one of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders).
134
See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYIUGHT § 13.08 (2001)
(explaining that good-faith mistakes and ignorance do not constitute defenses to a finding
of direct infringement, though they might affect remedies).
135 The Supreme Court noted that the lack of specific reference to secondary liability
within the Copyright Act does not preclude the imposition of liability on third parties. See
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
136 See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (defining a contributing party as "one who . .. induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another"); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that a party may incur contributory liability if he engages in "personal conduct that encourages or assists the
infringement").
137
Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162. Several decisions have imposed contributory liability if the third party should have known about the infringing conduct. See Cable/
Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 & n.29 (11th Cir. 1990)
(requiring that the secondary infringer "know or have reason to know" of the infringement); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (framing issue as "whether Netcom knew or should have known" of infringing activities).
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of public performance, and the distribution by individual A of unau138
thorized copies made by individual B.

Establishing vicarious liability requires the satisfaction of a twopronged test: (1) the defendant must have had the right and ability to
supervise the misappropriation of the copyrighted work; and (2) the
defendant must have had a directfinancial interestin the exploitation of
the copyrighted material. 139 Unlike vicarious liability in torts, vicarious liability for copyright infringement extends beyond the employeremployee relationship. Moreover, whereas contributory infringement
requires defendants to be aware of the infringement, defendants that
satisfy the requirements for vicarious liability are liable regardless of
140
their degree of awareness of the infringing conduct.
While the scope of direct liability is relatively clear, 141 the distinction between vicarious and contributory liability is often a matter of
dispute and a subject of litigation. 142 The controversy has focused on
the interpretation of the ability-to-supervise prong of vicarious liability, also known as the "control" requirement. 143 Two competing approaches have emerged regarding the requisite degree of third-party
138 E.g., Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. C.N. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247, 1249,
1256 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (supplying infringing tapes); Prather v. Camnerarts Publ'g Co., 1972
WL 17668 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 1972) (distribution).
139 See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
The Second Circuit explained:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the
absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired-the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.
Id. (citations omitted).
140

See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 134, § 12.04[A] [1) (noting that "[1]ack of

knowledge that the primary actor is actually engaged in infringing conduct is not a defense" under the doctrine of vicarious infringement).
141 The Internet context, however, demonstrates that the traditional definition of direct liability may not be appropriate for cyberspace. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839
F. Supp. 1552, 1554-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that the operator of a bulletin board
service directly infringed the copyrights of Playboy magazine by allowing users to upload
illegal copies of Playboy's photographs), superseded by statute as stated in ALS Scan, Inc. v.
RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001); see alsoJennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking
Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How FarDoes the Digital Millennium Coyright Act Online Service
ProviderLiabilityLimitationReach?, 7 CoMMLw CoNsPEcrUs 423, 430-31 (1999) (describing
courts' shift from direct to secondary liability for ISPs based on the recognition that traditional methods of analysis are not appropriate).
142 The distinction is of significant practical importance due to the difference in the
level of knowledge about the infringing activity required by each category. Whereas contributory liability requires some degree of awareness of primary infringement, vicarious
liability is imposed regardless of the third party's state of mind concerning the primary
infringement. See supra text accompanying notes 137, 140.
143 See Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. Rxv. 1005,
1012-20 (2000) (reviewing the conflicting approaches on the scope of the control prong
of vicarious liability for copyright infringement).
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control over the infringement by the primary wrongdoer: the "broad"
144
approach and the "narrow" approach.
a. Legal Control
The broad view extends liability to a party based on its "legal," or
potential, power to control the infringing conduct. 14 5 This approach
therefore finds control in any relationship in which the third party
reserves to itself, in principle, control over the infringing conduct
even when effectively exercising such control to distinguish between
infringing and non-infringing conduct, and to prevent only the former, is impractical.' 4 6 For example, it has been determined that a
finding of control of a trade show organizer over unauthorized uses of
songs by booth operators would be justified because the defendant
had the right to veto the playing of any music at all, even though he
lacked the ability to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized
songs. 147 Phrased differently, the broad approach to the control requirement assigns no weight to the cost of acquiring information
about the infringing nature of the activity. Rather, it finds control
whenever the third party, assuming that it knows of the nature of the
conduct, can prevent it from taking place. By focusing on Napster's
alleged inability to distinguish infringing and non-infringing files exchanged through its servers, the district court evidently endorsed this
broad approach to the control requirement.
b.

Actual Control

The narrow approach, in contrast, requires third parties to be
practically able to distinguish infringing and non-infringing conduct
in order to be liable for vicarious infringement. Under this approach,
"control requires more than the potential right to cease all activities
undifferentiated from the infringement, the right to terminate other
activities, or the effective ability to terminate only after infringement is
evident." 148 Instead, it requires that the third party could take "meaningful steps to prevent infringement." 149 Stated differently, the narrow approach requires not only that the cost of preventing conduct
known to be infringing be low, but also that the cost of monitoring
144

Id.

145

Id. at 1016-18.

146

See Kirkwood, supra note 51, at 719.

147 See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325-26,
1328-29 (D. Mass. 1994). The Second Circuit adopted similar logic in the Gershwincase, in
which it found that the defendant, an organizer of a circuit of community concerts, had
satisfied the "control" requirement merely because the relevant contract placed the defendant "in a position to police the infringing conduct of its artists." Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 1971).
148 Wright, supra note 143, at 1013 (footnote omitted).
149

Id.
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conduct of primary wrongdoers to determine whether it is infringing
will be low. 15 0 This approach is best illustrated by the position
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Napster. As described earlier, this
court ruled that the injunction must take into account Napster's ability to identify infringing files.
c.

Implicationsfor ISP Liability

As evidenced by the Napster litigation, the choice between these
two approaches has significant implications for ISPs. ISPs undoubtedly have full technical control over subscribers' conduct, whether infringing or not. Hosting service providers, for example, are technically
positioned to remove all subscribers' information stored on their servers.151 Accordingly, they would nearly always satisfy the control requirement of vicarious infringement under the broad approach.
Adopting the broad approach would therefore render most ISPs vicariously liable for subscriber copyright infringement, and therefore
would subject ISPs to liability even when they were clearly unable to
distinguish between legitimate and unlawful subscriber conduct. Put
differently, adopting the broad approach would impose an effective
regime of strict ISP liability for subscriber misconduct. Under the narrow approach, in contrast, ISPs would be liable only for the misconduct that they were capable of detecting.
The risk of imposing strict liability on ISPs based exclusively on
their technical ability to control user misconduct has sparked academic writing vigorously objecting to the adoption of the broad version of the control requirement with respect to ISPs.152 Before
discussing which test should apply to ISPs, I shall now explore the
conventional economic understanding of vicarious infringement and
offer a new understanding that would illuminate the proper application of vicarious liability to ISPs.
2.

A New Rationalefor Vicarious Infringement

Under its predominant explanation, vicarious infringement aims
at identifying the real primary wrongdoer. That is, its objective is to
go beyond the narrow, technical definition of direct infringement to
identify a broader set of parties who should ultimately internalize the
150 See Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g (USA), Inc., Nos. 93 CIV. 3428 (JFK), 73163,
1994 WL 191643, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1994) (explicitly considering the prohibitive supervision cost by a trade show organizer with respect to music played by exhibitors, and
refusing to find "control"); Wright, supra note 143, at 1014 (stating that "[t]he cost of

policing can also preclude a finding of actual control").
151

Note also that most ISPs reserve for themselves, in their agreement with their users,

the right to remove materials, and thus satisfy the "legal right" element of the control test.
152 See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 49, at 399-410; Wright, supranote 143, at 1026-36;
Yen, supra note 14, at 1843-72.
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cost of infringement. 153 Consider the paradigmatic example of vicarious liability in copyright-the liability of dance hall proprietors for
copyright violations by musicians that they hire to perform on their
property. 154 Under this predominant understanding, dance hall proprietors are held strictly liable because they should internalize the cost
of infringement notwithstanding the direct infringement by the musicians they hire.
This economic rationale for vicarious infringement justifies the
broad interpretation of the control element. Under economic theory,
primary wrongdoers should internalize the cost of their misconduct
regardless of their ability to prevent it. All that matters is that the
defendant is one who should scale its level of activity to the socially
desirable level taking into account the costs of its misconduct. Thus,
the "ability and control" element of vicarious infringement should not
be limited to parties who can effectively police infringement and accurately distinguish infringing and non-infringing uses. Rather, it
should be designed to identify parties who should bear the cost of
1 55
infringement even when avoiding infringement is too costly.

I believe, however, that identifying primary wrongdoers might
not be the only economic objective underlying vicarious infringement. An alternative objective of vicarious infringement might be to
impose liability on third parties while eliminating the risk of overdeterrence produced by the divergent incentives of primary infringers and
third parties. As I shall demonstrate below, recognizing this alternative rationale has important implications for ISP liability.
As explained in Part I, an optimal regime of third-party liability
should target only parties who are positioned to prevent inexpensively
the misconduct at stake.1 56 Contributory infringement targets one
class of parties who are in such a position by penalizing those who
know about the infringement. However, limiting liability to informed
third parties leaves out those who, although initially uninformed, can
monitor and detect infringement at a relatively low cost. Under its
153 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 134, § 12.04[A] [1] (noting views under which
the doctrine of vicarious infringement is "an application of the principle that a master is
civilly liable for the wrongful acts of his servant performed within the scope of his employment, even if such acts are done without express authority or contrary to orders"); Yen,
supra note 14, at 1843 (asserting that both vicarious infringement and the tort doctrine of
respondeat superior "share a common basis in enterprise liability, which states that enterprises should internalize losses caused by their existence as a cost of doing business").
154 See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n,
554 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding racetrack vicariously liable for hiring infringer to play music to patrons).
155 Unfortunately, economic theory has yet to develop clear causation tests to distinguish primary and secondary wrongdoers. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (reviewing the
murky boundaries of the optimal-production objective).
156 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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alternative economic interpretation, the doctrine of vicarious infringement fills this gap by targeting third parties with low monitoring
costs, and providing them with incentives to detect infringements.
This interpretation leaves an intriguing feature of vicarious infringement unexplained. Vicarious infringement requires that third
parties derive financial gain from the underlying misconduct. 157 If
liability is expanded to third parties based on their low costs of prevention, however, there seems to be no justification for further inquiring
about the financial gains they derive from the infringing activity. After all, all courts need to do is apply the actual control test and determine whether the defendant has the effective ability to identify
infringement.
At this juncture, the incentive-divergence thesis becomes relevant. As I have argued, imposing strict liability on third parties will
induce them to monitor excessively. I have also shown that, the
overdeterrence phenomenon notwithstanding, ISPs who capture a
benefit for any additional item posted on their network are better
positioned to self-assess the cost and the benefits of monitoring than
other third parties.1 58 The financial gain requirement can thus be
interpreted as a mechanism to ensure that the third party captures at
least a portion of the benefits of the conduct it is entrusted with policing. Under this interpretation, the financial gain requirement seeks
to ensure that third parties, though positioned to monitor against infringements, will not engage in excessive monitoring because they do
not internalize the social cost of their monitoring activities.
This new economic understanding of vicarious infringement has
two implications for the requisite elements of vicarious infringement.
First, because vicarious liability should be imposed on parties who can
monitor effectively for copyright violations, courts should apply the
narrow approach to the control requirement. Second, courts should
construe the financial gain requirement narrowly, and refuse to rely
on some vague, speculative link between defendants' profits and the
infringing activity. Rather, the financial gain requirement should be
satisfied only when the third party captures direct benefits from the
conduct of the primary wrongdoer. 159
To summarize, vicarious infringement serves two distinct functions: identifying primary infringers, and providing third partieswith incentives to detect infringement. These different functions entail
157
158
159

See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
See discussion supra Part IIIA.
Cf Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1494 (arguing for vicarious, perhaps even direct,

liability for commercial online service providers as they have "direct financial interest,"
particularly when "the availability of copyrighted works on the network enhances the service's appeal to potential subscribers").
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different requirements for finding vicarious liability. While the first
requires us to determine whether the particular defendant ought to
internalize the losses from infringement, the second requires us to
identify parties that are positioned to monitor copyright violations
and that have interests which are somewhat aligned with those of primary infringers. The new economic objective that I offer is intended
to supplement, rather than replace, the conventional understanding
of vicarious infringement. To be sure, the distinct goals of vicarious
infringement should be clarified, perhaps by creating two separate legal doctrines. Yet, even under the current legal regime, the new understanding of vicarious infringement can provide a framework for a
sensible application of vicarious infringement to the providers of Internet services.
3.

ISPs: Napster Revisited

Having identified an alternative economic function of vicarious
infringement, I now turn to examine its implications for ISP liability.
As mentioned earlier, ISPs undoubtedly satisfy the broad version
of the control requirement of vicarious infringement. However, for
those who seriously believe that ISPs should not be perceived as primary wrongdoers, subjecting them to vicarious infringement is conceptually inconsistent with the traditional economic function of
vicarious infringement. After all, if ISPs should not internalize the
social loss produced by subscriber misconduct, why subject them to
liability under a doctrine essentially aimed at primary wrongdoers?
The new understanding of vicarious liability fundamentally alters
this picture. Because vicarious liability is also designed to target third
parties capable of preventing infringement, there is no inconsistency
in subjecting ISPs to vicarious infringement using the narrow version
of the control requirement. Applying the narrow test of control will
identify ISPs that are positioned to detect infringing conduct by subscribers. Imposing strict liability on these ISPs will provide them with
incentives to police user conduct. By limiting liability to ISPs that derive some financial gains from items transmitted through their networks, vicarious infringement is less likely to result in excessive
monitoring and overly stringent screening policies.
Finally, uncovering the distinct economic functions that underlie
vicarious infringement sheds a new light on the positions of the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Napster. In adopting the broad
version of the control requirement, the district court implied that
Napster should ultimately internalize the social loss produced by its
service. That is, according to the district court, Napster is a primary
wrongdoer rather than a third party harnessed by the legal system to
prevent wrongdoing by others. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit views
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Napster as a third party. As a third party, Napster's scope of liability
should be closely related to its ability to detect wrongdoing and prevent it. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's logic, the scope of liability
imposed on Napster should be determined by the practical ability of
Napster, given the architecture of its service, to detect copyright infringement. Furthermore, as Napster was found to derive sufficient
financial interest, subjecting it to vicarious liability is less likely to result in excessive blocking of files.
The discussion thus far has largely assumed the existence of the
financial-interest element of vicarious liability. As mentioned above,
this element of vicarious infringement is important in light of the divergence of incentives between ISPs and their subscribers, which
could result in overdeterrence. For strict liability not to result in excessive monitoring and overzealous removal policies, the financial-interest element should be construed narrowly. Specifically, financial
interest should be found only when the ISP bears an actual cost when
censoring items stored on, or transmitted through, its networks. In
the Religious Center decision, for example, the district court ruled that
a provider of web-hosting services for online bulletin board services
does not meet the financial benefit requirement because it charges
flat fees for its service.' 60 In the Napster case, the district and circuit
courts found financial interest based on Napster's future plans to
charge fees for its service.' 6 1 The commercial use of the Internet is
still in its early stages, and Internet business models are evolving at a
rapid pace. 162 Thus, it seems courts must continue to struggle with
the precise nature of the financial-gain requirement under the narrow
interpretation of vicarious infringement.
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
This subpart will assess the success of Tite II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), 163 the most extensive regula160
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1376-77
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting, nonetheless, that the provider potentially did have the ability to
supervise); see also Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & Northwest
Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting vicarious liability because
the contract specified fixed fees). But see Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp.
1171, 1177 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (finding a bulletin board service operator vicariously liable in
spite of its flat fee arrangement because the presence of infringing content attracted users
to the site).
See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001),
161
affg in part and rev'g in part 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
162 A relevant example is the current doubt over the economic feasibility of providing
free Internet access by ISPs. SeeJason Anders, InternetFirnsRevise Free-ServiceStrategy, WALL
ST.J., Mar. 22, 2001, at B14.
17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. V 1999).
163
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tion of ISP liability so far, in coping with ISP overdeterrence. 164 I will
first examine the DMCA's effect on the costs of contracting between
subscribers and ISPs over censorship practices adopted by ISPs. I will
then analyze the extent to which the DMCA provides service providers
with incentives to detect user misconduct.
Congress enacted Title II of the DMCA to limit ISP liability for
copyright infringement by their subscribers. 16 5 The DMCA essentially
creates a series of affirmative defenses, or "safe harbors," for service
providers that might have been found liable for copyright violations
under traditional principles of copyright law. 166 The requirements for
enjoying these safe harbors depend on the type of service provided.
The DMCA generally distinguishes among four types of servicestransitory digital network communications, system caching, storage of
information at the direction of users, and information location
167
tools-and provides each type of service with different rules.
1.

Incentive Divergence Under the DMCA

As Part II argues, the severity of the ISP overdeterrence phenomenon depends on the cost of contracting between ISPs and their subscribers over screening and removal policies. Part III introduces the
legal strategy of regulating the ISP-subscriber interface, which seeks to
facilitate such contracting between the parties.' 6 8 The DMCA does
adopt several measures affecting the cost of contracting over monitoring policies between service providers and users. However, it seems
that the DMCA did not go far enough in facilitating contracting between service providers and their subscribers.
To begin, the DMCA requires service providers to notify their
69
users of their policy of terminating accounts of repeat infringers.1
This requirement, by providing subscribers with information concerning termination policies, somewhat reduces their costs of transacting
with service providers. However, the DMCA does not require service
providers to notify their users of other aspects of their compliance

164 For an insightful, comprehensive analysis of the DMCA, see David Nimmer, A Riff
on Fair Use in the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act 148 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 680-82 (2000).
165 For a review of the legislative history of Title II of the DMCA, see Beams, supra note
51, at 831-41.
166 The DMCA defines "service provider" as a "provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor." 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (1). Courts have not yet
determined the scope of Internet services covered by this definition.
167 See id. § 512(a)-(d).
168 See discussion supra Part III.B.
169 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
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policies, such as the technology that they employ to screen for copy170
right infringement.
Moreover, the DMCA includes additional provisions that might
impede contracting over removal policies by service providers. The
most important measure is the immunity from liability granted to service providers that remove materials from the Internet.' 7 ' This immunity not only further encourages service providers to disregard the
cost associated with their screening policies and their removal decisions, but also potentially impedes any attempt to contract over monitoring policies between service providers and their users.1 72 This
potentially perverse effect of the immunity granted to service providers is somewhat alleviated by two other provisions of the DMCA. First,
the DMCA imposes liability on copyright owners who provide service
providers with false allegations that induce the ISP to remove legitimate materials from its networks. 173 This provision clearly aims at discouraging copyright owners from making false allegations to ISPs, and
thereby at reducing the risk of ISP overdeterrence. In addition, in
order to enjoy the immunity for the removal of materials, the ISP
must notify the subscriber immediately and give it the opportunity to
respond and dispute the removal decision.1 7 4 By limiting the immunity to service providers that notify their users, the DMCA provides
service providers with incentives to notify their subscribers of removal
175
decisions.
170

Indeed, as will be discussed below, the DMCA does not require service providers to

monitor. Nevertheless, some monitoring will still be required for service providers that do
not qualify for a safe harbor under the DMCA.
171 See id. § 5 12 (g) (1) (baring service provider liability for claims "based on the service
provider's good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be
infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,
regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing").
172 SeeYen, supra note 14, at 1888 (arguing that this immunity provision would induce
ISPs to engage in excessive censorship).
173 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (imposing liability on any person who makes a knowingly false
claim of infringement that results in the removal or disabling of access to the relevant
material). The deterrent effect produced by this section will not eliminate overdeterrence
to the extent ISPs will be required to remove infringing materials even without a notice
from copyright holders.
174 See id. § 512(g) (2). Under this provision, the ISP needs to take reasonable steps
promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed the material. Id. § 512(g) (2) (A).
The subscriber is then granted the opportunity to dispute the decision by providing the
service provider with a "counter notification." Id. § 512(g) (2) (B). Upon the receipt of
such counter-notification, the service provider has to enable access to the material unless
the copyright holder files an action seeking a court order. Id. § 512(g) (2) (C). For further
analysis of these sections, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislationfor the "DigitalMillennium', 23 CoLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 137, 162-63 (1999).
175
Cf Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2) (Supp. V 1999).
This section provides that:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable
on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
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These preconditions to ISP immunity, however, apply only to the
providers of hosting services. Other service providers, such as the
providers of Internet access, are not required to follow notification
requirements to qualify for this immunity. 176 This particular result is
very problematic. Subscribers of Internet access services are less likely
than website operators to learn about their service providers' decision
to block access to a particular site. Moreover, even when subscribers
of access services learn about their ISP's decision to block access to a
specific site, collective action problems will most likely impede their
ability to dispute that decision. Therefore, subscribers of access services should enjoy greater protection than should subscribers of hosting services. 177 This protection could be achieved by granting users a
right to sue their access providers in case they unjustifiably blocked
Internet access, or by imposing mandatory disclosure requirements on
access providers who seek to block access.17 8 In any event, the DMCA
fails to provide sufficient protection to subscribers of access services.
This failure is very significant because it is very likely that the emergence of distributed peer-to-peer file exchange services in the aftermath of the Napsterinjunction would increase the pressure of content
providers on access providers to prevent the access of their users to
1 79
these file-sharing networks.
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or
others the technical means to restrict access to [said material].
Id. Unlike the DMCA, the Communications Decency Act does not impose notification
requirements on ISPs.
176 The DMCA undoubtedly applies to access service providers. See Markiewicz, supra
note 141, at 435-37 (stating that access service providers are included under § 512(a) of

the DMCA).
177
As emphasized in the text, this argument applies only to a decision by a service
provider to filter a particular site. Clearly, a subscriber would find out easily that her access
provider has decided to terminate her account and prevent her from accessing the
Internet.
178
One might argue that there is no need to grant subscribers greater protections
because access providers will satisfy their condition for safe harbor much more easily than
hosting-service providers. Thus, the risk of overdeterrence of access providers is less significant. Nevertheless, given the ambiguity of the DMCA, access providers are still exposed to
a substantial risk of liability.
179

SeeJohn Borland, Post NapsterPolicing Reopens ISP Wounds, CNET NEws.CoM, Mar.

27, 2001 (reporting pressure of copyright holders on Internet access providers to police
file-swapping networks), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-5263497.htnl. Recently, however, the music industry has re-adopted the strategy of directing its enforcement effort at companies offering users the ability to exchange files. See Gwendolyn
Mariano, Music PublishersFile New Copyright Suit, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 20, 2001 (reporting

a recent lawsuit brought by the National Music Publishers' Association against three companies offering file-swapping services: MusicCity, Grokster, and Kazaa), at http://investor.cnet.com/investor/news/newsitem/0-9900-1028-7935995-0.html; John Borland, Suit
Hits PopularPost-NapsterNetwork, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 3, 2001 (reporting similar lawsuits,

WHO'S LIABLE FOR CYBERWRONGS?

2002]
2.

MonitoringRegulation

A monitoring-regulation model of ISP liability is expected to
specify the optimal level of policing that should be adopted by ISPs
that wish to avoid liability.' 8 0 The DMCA, however, explicitly declines
to impose monitoring duties on service providers.18 ' One might perceive this failure to impose monitoring duties as an expression of Congress's general position, applicable even outside the copyright
context, that ISPs should not monitor user conduct. I find this interpretation to be flawed. The unwillingness to impose affirmative monitoring duties on service providers for copyright infringement is best
viewed as expressing a position about the optimal level of ISP monitoring in the specific context of copyright, where copyright holders
have superior ability to detect copyright infringement. Imposing strict
liability on service providers will leave copyright owners with no incentives to assist in acquiring information about infringement by subscribers. 182 As copyright holders are often better positioned than the
dispersed ISP industry to detect online infringement, it might be desirable to impose on them the burden of acquiring information about
copyright infringement'18 3 Under this logic, ISPs, although exempt
from monitoring obligations concerning copyright, should be subjected to affirmative monitoring duties concerning unlawful conduct,
such as online child pornography, with respect to which they are better positioned than the state, or the victims, to detect wrongdoing.
Indeed, while the DMCA does not impose affirmative monitoring
duties on service providers, it provides elaborate regulations addressing copyright holders' role in providing service providers with information about infringement, especially with respect to the providers of
hosting services. The DMCA limits the monetary liability of hostingservices providers that have no knowledge of infringement.18 4 This
against the same defendants, filed by movie studios and record labels), at http://
news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-7389552.html.
180

See discussion supra Part III.C.

181 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (1) (Supp. V 1999) (cautioning against reading the section
as imposing a duty on a service provider to monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts
indicating infringing activity). Of course, if a service provider fails to meet the conditions
for immunity under the DMCA, it might face monitoring duties under the traditional regime of copyright liability.
182
See SHAvI.L, supra note 23, at 11 (emphasizing that imposing strict liability on the
injurer provides victims with no incentive to exercise caution); see also A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the role of the music
industry in detecting infringement on the Napster system, and requiring record companies
to provide notice of copyrighted music available for download on the system).
183
But see Ginsburg, supra note 174, at 162 (contending that this failure to provide
ISPs with monitoring incentives under the DMCA leaves copyright holders with inadequate
protection).
184
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1). The DMCA also requires that the ISP would derive no financial benefit from the infringing activity. See id. § 512(c) (1) (B).
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immunity requires, however, that the ISP appoint an agent whom copyright owners can notify, and that this agent's contact information appear on the ISP's website. 185 The DMCA also elaborates on the
precise notice that should be sent by copyright owners to ISPs. 186 Finally, ISPs are required to accommodate any standard technical measures taken by copyright owners to identify or protect their works. 187
Together, these regulations reflect the perception that, in the copyright context, copyright holders should bear the burden of detecting
copyright infringement.
C. Auction Sites
Auction sites offer subscribers the opportunity to auction various
items through their online systems. The subscriber posts the items
she wishes to sell on the auction site. The operator of the site maintains the site and its auction software, notifies sellers and successful
bidders when the bid is complete, and offers additional services to
facilitate the transaction, such as online payments.1 88 In return for
these services, auction sites charge fees whose magnitude is proportional to the sale price of items auctioned through their system. 189
The issue of auction-site liability arises when subscribers use the
service to sell illegal items, such as bootlegged music or illegal
drugs) 90 Recently, the desirable scope of auction-site liability for illegal items offered for sale by its subscribers has received public attention following a controversial decision by a French court requiring
Yahoo! to block all French users from buying Nazi memorabilia on its
auction site. 19 1 Recent public interest notwithstanding, the current
rules that govern the liability of the providers of online auctioning
185 Id. § 512(c) (2).
186 Id. § 512(c) (3).
187 Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
188 See, e.g., eBay Inc., Seller Guide, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/sellerguide/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
189 See, e.g., eBay Inc., Fees, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/sellerguide/selling-

fees.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
190 See Kelley E. Moohr, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold! Are Sales of Copyrighted Items Exposing Internet Auction Sites to Liability , 21 Loy. L.A. Er. L. REv. 97, 98 (2000) (observing
that "eBay has... become a hotbed for unauthorized sales of copyrighted works"); Mylene
Mangalindan, Alleged DrugSale on eBay Raises Liability Issue,WALL ST.J., May 30, 2000, at B18
(reporting a case in which high school students allegedly purchased drugs in an eBay
auction).
191 See generally Carl S. Kaplan, Ruling on Nazi Memorabilia Sparks Legal Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov.
24, 2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/24/technology/
24CYBERLAW.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002), for a history of the controversy. In the
aftermath of this decision, Yahoo! announced a policy of screening hateful and violent
materials out of its auctions, classified section, and shopping areas. Lisa Guernsey, Yahoo to
Try Harderto Rid Postings of Hateful Material N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2001, at C2.
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services in the United States are yet to be clarified by courts. 192 This
subpart argues that auction sites should be liable for illegal items auctioned through their systems under a standard of strict liability with
reduced penalties.
Like many other providers of Internet services, auction sites do
not capture the full value of the items they would be entrusted with
policing under the liability regime I offer. Auction sites, however, currently charge their subscribers fees for each item posted for sale.
Moreover, the size of these fees is determined according to the sale
price of the item posted on the site. Auction sites will thus suffer an
additional cost for any item that they decline to auction. The cost
borne by the auction site will be proportional to the value of the item
removed from the system. As explained above, 19 3 under these circumstances the ISP overdeterrence phenomenon could be mitigated, and
perhaps even eliminated, by combining a regime of strict ISP liability
with scaled-down penalties.
Moreover, because the cost of ex post negotiation between auction sites and their subscribers is relatively low, the incentives of auction sites will tend to align with those of their users. Sellers whose
items have been rejected as unlawful will most likely learn very quickly
about this rejection. The ability of subscribers to learn promptly of
removal decisions substantially reduces the risk of excessive censorship. Furthermore, because a seller who believes that his item has
been wrongfully rejected has an incentive to contact the auction site
and dispute this decision, there is no collective action problem. Finally, switching costs, those associated with offering the item for sale
on alternative sites, are negligible for subscribers of auction sites.
To be sure, as dictated by the economic theory of third-party liability, auction sites should be held liable only for sales that could be
easily identified as illegal by existing monitoring technologies. Consider the difference between the sale of a photograph of Michael Jordan bearing his fake signature and the sale of a software labeled by
the seller as "pirated." Determining the legal status of the Michael
Jordan photograph requires the inspection of the photograph itself,
which is transferred directly from the seller to the successful bidder.
An auction site is thus unable to police items for misconduct of this
type, and it would be undesirable to make it strictly liable for such
192 A recent decision by a California state court held that § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, granted immunity to eBay for facilitating the auctioning of infringing sound recordings. See Stoner v. eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637,
at '*3-*5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000). Meanwhile, eBay, surrendering to pressure ex-

erted by software makers and other intellectual property interests, has adopted a policy of
monitoring its site for sales of infringing items. Simpson, supra note 75.
193 See supra Part III.A.
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subscriber misconduct. The liability of auction sites should evidently
19 4
be limited to the sale of items of the second type.
CONCLUSION

The Internet's prompt, accurate, and inexpensive distribution of
digital information encompasses a clear promise for human prosperity. However, the fascinating capabilities of the Internet also produce
greater opportunities for unlawful conduct and challenge conventional strategies of law enforcement. The failure of the existing methods of law enforcement effectively to prevent online wrongdoing has
sparked legal attempts to target the providers of Internet services and
hold them liable for their subscribers' misconduct. Unfortunately,
while policymakers and courts have been struggling in recent years to
strike the appropriate balance between the need to prevent online
misconduct and the risk of inhibiting the growth of the Internet, the
issue of ISP liability has received little consistent theoretical treatment
by legal scholarship.
In this Article, I attempted to fill this gap and provide the first
step on the way to rectifying the balkanized analysis of ISP liability.
ISPs are third parties harnessed by the legal system to police the conduct of primary wrongdoers, their subscribers. While ISPs possess the
technical ability to prevent user misconduct, they do not capture the
full value of the conduct they are entrusted with policing. Thus, subjecting ISPs to strict liability for the full social harm produced by subscriber misconduct will result in excessive monitoring and overzealous
censorship. The Article has identified the role of contractual costs
and market forces in aligning the incentives of ISPs with those of their
subscribers, and the ensuing implications for designing an optimal
ISP liability regime.
But for a brief discussion illustrating the illuminative power of the
incentive-divergence thesis, the Article has been mostly devoted to developing a framework for evaluating optimal liability standards for
ISPs. Designing an optimal ISP liability regime for a particular context requires a careful examination of the type of the service at stake
and of the nature of the misconduct involved. The type of the service
at stake determines the extent to which market forces could be relied
upon to mitigate the severity of the divergent incentives. The nature
of the misconduct determines the extent to which ISPs are positioned
to distinguish between lawful and unlawful subscriber conduct. As the
commercial use of the Internet is still evolving, it is very likely that
194 See also Ebay's Liability Is Cleared in Suit, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 20, 2001, at C14 (reporting a
San Diego court's dismissal of a class action suit against eBay brought on the grounds that
the company had a responsibility to ensure the authenticity of the items sold through its
website).
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courts will need to rely on this framework and adapt it to pathbreaking Internet-related services and, unfortunately but inevitably, innovative Internet crimes.

